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   5 
Summary  
Entrepreneurs in small and medium sized firms (SMEs) are dynamic when it comes to 
decision-making. 65% of the interviewed entrepreneurs in our sample took an impor-
tant decision in the last three years or will take an important decision in the near future. 
In this report we investigated the stages and crucial moments in the decision-making 
process of SMEs. By means of two extensive pilot studies we developed a model, distin-
guishing three stages and two moments (figure 1).  
figure 1  Developed model of the decision-making process by SMEs 
 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
In the first stage the entrepreneur has an idea. We distinguish two types of ideas. Ideas 
that are formed purely by chance are almost always due to external factors. Someone 
else conceives the idea. The entrepreneur reacts intuitively or emotionally to this idea 
Other ideas are the result of a maturing process started to solve a problem and these 
ideas gradually gain strength. The entrepreneurs are aware of the idea, entrepreneurs 
probably have ideas milling around in their heads all the time. Only a few of such ideas 
survive. Some entrepreneurs admit they had more ideas. However, one idea dominates.  
 
The trigger together with the informal decision is the first crucial moment. A trigger is 
an event that sends the entrepreneur into action. A relatively immature idea needs a 
strong direct trigger but a weak indirect trigger is sufficient for a relatively mature idea. 
It is possible that the idea and the trigger arrive at the same time. The trigger results in 
immediate action and we recognise the moment of the informal decision by the action 
the entrepreneur takes. The entrepreneur is now ready to elaborate his idea. 
 
The elaboration of the idea takes place in a second stage. The entrepreneur has set his 
goal but does not know exactly how he is going to achieve it. At this stage the entre-
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Moment 2:  
Formal decision6   
accountants, tax advisors or colleague entrepreneurs are consulted. The entrepreneur 
considers alternatives routes to elaborate the idea and estimates the risks. During this 
entire stage the entrepreneur keeps track of the risks. Problems that come to light are 
resolved gradually.  
 
Once the entrepreneur has almost finished the elaboration of the idea it is time for the 
second moment, the formal decision. This formal decision is usually a signed agreement 
or the first step towards implementing the idea. After the formal decision has been 
made there is no way back. 
 
In the final stage the entrepreneur implements the decision. Some entrepreneurs ex-
perience various problems at this stage as the implementation of the idea turned out to 
be harder than they expected. The problems may lead to a change in the method of 
implementation, but the idea itself never changes. Despite the problems, the entrepre-
neur remains convinced that his idea is good. The majority of the entrepreneurs are sat-
isfied once they have implemented the decision. Sometimes the result turns out to be 
different from what they expected in the first place.    7 
1 Introduction 
Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) play a key role in the modern market econ-
omy. Strategic decisions made by small and medium sized business entrepreneurs
1 form 
the heart of entrepreneurship and can therefore be considered as essential for the dy-
namics in the economy. Surprisingly, little is known about the decision-making process 
within SMEs. On the other hand there is abundant literature concerning strategic deci-
sion-making in large firms. Brouthers et al. (1998) state that past strategic decision-
making research focuses mostly on the 'procedural rationality' of decisions in large 
multinational firms. However, there is the feeling among many researchers (e.g. 
Papadakis et al., 1998, Brouthers, 1998; Beattie, 1999; Gilmore and Carson, 2000; 
Cummins et al., 2001) that independent entrepreneurs (owners/directors of SMEs) and 
managers of large firms differ when it comes to decision-making. For example Busenitz 
and Barney (1997) assert that entrepreneurs are more susceptible to the use of 
decision-making biases and heuristics than are managers in large organizations. Studies 
on the entrepreneurial decision-making process will enrich the knowledge of 
mechanisms that drive SMEs to participate in the economy life of the state, contributing 
to growth and prosperity for society. In particular, the decision-making model 
developed by Mintzberg (1976) inspired us to investigate the decision-making process 
within SMEs.    
In 2002 EIM started a research program which investigates the decision-making process 
of small and medium sized business entrepreneurs in the Netherlands. In 2002 re-
searchers from EIM interviewed ten entrepreneurs about the crucial factors and mo-
ments in their decision-making process, because the decision-making process largely 
takes place inside the head of the entrepreneur. We looked for strategic decisions re-
sulting in a clear discontinuity in the course of the organisation. The results of this pro-
visional investigation were published in a research report (in Dutch)
2. This study pro-
vided us with many insights in the decision-making process of SMEs. It helped us to 
perceive the crucial stages and moments in the decision-making process of SMEs.  
 
Although we were able to distinguish three stages and two crucial moments the results 
of this first pilot study were provisional. Some aspects of the decision-making process of 
entrepreneurs needed to be clarified in more detail. There were some gaps that need to 
be filled especially when it came to the emergence of an idea. In addition we wanted to 
hypothesize whether a new set of case studies would confirm the stages and moments 
found in the first pilot study and therefore we executed a second pilot study. The re-
sults of both studies are described in this research report. The combined results of both 
studies helped us to describe more precisely the decision-making process of entrepre-




   Wennekers and Thurik (1999) distinguish three types of entrepreneurs: Schumpeterian entrepre-
neurs, the intrapreneurs and the managerial business owners. In this report we use the term entre-
preneur for a managerial business owner (business owners or self-employed) of a small or medium 
sized enterprise (SME).  
2
   Gibcus, P. and P.H.M. van Hoesel (2003), The decision-making entrepreneur in a SME: a preliminary 
investigation ('De beslissende ondernemer in het MKB: een vooronderzoek'), EIM, Zoetermeer. 8   
The objective of this research is to map the decision-making process of entrepreneurs in 
SMEs. We formulated the following central question: 
 
What are the stages and crucial moments in the decision-making  
process of entrepreneurs in SMEs? 
 
Structure of the report 
In chapter 2 we discuss the research methods used in the first and second pilot studies. 
Chapter 3 deals with the provisional results of the first pilot study and based on these 
results we formulated six hypotheses. In chapter 4 we examine these hypotheses and 
support or reject them using the results of the second pilot study. We retrieved a great 
deal of information from both pilot studies to give an accurate description of the entre-
preneurial decision-making process. Chapter 5 gives a general overview of this decision-
making process. Parallel to both pilot studies we performed a literature search. In chap-
ter 6 we present a literature overview and we make a comparison between the litera-
ture and our findings. Finally, in chapter 7 we give a preview of further research on this 
subject. The case studies of the first pilot study are described briefly in Annex I and 
those of the second pilot study in Annex II.   9 
2 Research  method 
In the past two years EIM performed two pilot studies on the decision-making process 
by SMEs. The first pilot study had a very exploratory character. As a literature search 
was performed parallel to the case studies, we were hardly influenced by decision-
making models described in literature. The only article of influence was that of Mintz-
berg (1976), but we did not allow this article to affect our interviews too much. We just 
wanted to let the entrepreneurs talk and hear their stories. We, as researchers, wanted 
to keep an objective point of view. The results of the first pilot study resulted in a dif-
ferent approach in the second pilot study. This second pilot study was more of a con-
firmatory nature. We wanted to expand and hypothesize our findings from the first pi-
lot study.  
The population in both pilot studies consisted of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) in the Netherlands. The number of employees in enterprises is often used as a 
guideline when it comes to defining SMEs. Mostly SMEs in the Netherlands are defined 
as companies with no more than 100 employees. In many other countries SMEs are en-
terprises with a maximum of 250 employees. 
In this chapter we shall discuss the research methods used in the first and the second 
pilot studies.  
2.1  The first pilot study 
For the first pilot study we selected entrepreneurs from the 'EIM SME-Panel'. This panel 
was set up and is controlled by EIM. Its major objective is to collect information about 
knowledge, attitude and opinions of entrepreneurs about various (government) policy-
related issues. The panel started in 1999, and, on average, the firms are interviewed 3 
times a year on varying topics. In each round about 2,000 companies are interviewed by 
means of computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI). The entrepreneur or the 
general manager of the company provides the answers. The 'EIM SME-Panel' consists of 
Dutch companies with fewer than 100 employees, distributed equally across three size 
classes (0-9 employees, 10-49 employees and 50-99 employees) and nine sectors. The 
nine sectors distinguished are construction, manufacturing, trade and repairs, accom-
modation and catering, financial services, other services, rental and real estate, and fi-
nally transport and communication.  
At our request, during the second measurement in 2002, the panel included four ques-
tions about decision-making. The questions were: 
1  Did you take one or more strategic decisions in the last three years? 
2  If yes: Could you give a short description of your last strategic decision? 
3  Did this decision work out positively or negatively? 
4  Are you satisfied with the result of your decision?  
 
Results of the panel 
In total 1,329 entrepreneurs responded to our four questions. About 77% of the par-
ticipants stated that they took one or more strategic decision (go or no-go) during the 
last three years. This high percentage can be called remarkable from the point of view 
of the 'conventional wisdom' that SMEs exhibit almost no economic dynamic activity. 
Moreover, three quarters of the entrepreneurs were, in the end, satisfied about their 
decision.  
 10   
Selection of the case studies 
We were looking for strategic decisions that had resulted in a clear discontinuity in the 
course of the organisation. Out of the 'EIM SME-Panel' we eventually selected ten en-
trepreneurs who were willing to tell us more about their strategic decision-making dur-
ing an in-depth interview. For practical reasons the selected SMEs were not distributed 
across the whole country. The selected SMEs belonged to several sectors and the deci-
sions concerned various matters. We made no attempt to select female entrepreneurs. 
Characteristics such firm size and age of the company were not selection criteria. 
Basically we were interested mainly in entrepreneurs that took a go-decision. Our selec-
tion consisted of eight entrepreneurs that took a go-decision and two entrepreneurs 
that took a no-go-decision. These two entrepreneurs stated during the telephone survey 
that they had taken a no-go decision. However, during the interview it became appar-
ent that they had taken an alternative go-decision. As a result all case studies involve a 
go-decision. In two case studies the entrepreneurs were not content with the result of 
their decision.  
 
The case studies 
The appointment was confirmed by letter. One entrepreneur cancelled his appointment 
a few days before the appointment, but another firm offered us two case studies. 
Therefore, no new appointment was necessary. The ten participating SMEs received a 
questionnaire in advance. This questionnaire was inspired partly by the decision-making 
model described by Mintzberg (1976). Receiving the questionnaire in advance helped 
the entrepreneurs to prepare for the interview and so make it easier for us to obtain the 
correct information. We looked on the internet for information about the SME as this 
helped us to place ourselves, to some extent, in the entrepreneur's situation.  
The in-depth interviews were held in July and August 2002. Two researchers were pre-
sent at each interview. One researcher led the discussion and the other took notes. The 
questionnaire served as a manual during the interview. A case report was made for 
each interview containing some background information, answers to the questions and 
a brief summary. The reports were sent to the entrepreneurs for their comments and, if 
necessary, completion. In almost all cases the entrepreneurs' response was received 
within a couple of weeks. A brief description of the ten case studies is given in Annex I. 
The case study reports were used to analyse the decision-making process.  
 
Analysis of the case studies 
Two steps were involved in performing the analysis based on the case studies in the first 
pilot study. The first step consisted of a global qualitative analysis in which the differ-
ences and similarities were discussed. The second step concerned an additional 'quanti-
tative' comparison of the cases. As far as possible, the answers of the entrepreneurs 
were categorised and coded. We considered the categorisation to be preparation for 
future research on this subject. Because the number of cases was small we realised that 
all important topics had been found in the first qualitative analysis. The results of this 
analysis are discussed in chapter 3. Parallel to the case studies we performed a literature 
search (Ivanova and Gibcus, 2003). Finally we confronted our results with the results we 
found in literature.   11 
2.2  The second pilot study 
The set-up of the second pilot study was somewhat different from that of the first pilot 
study. Because we did not want to interview the participants of the 'EIM SME-Panel' 
again about their decision-making process we decided to set up our own panel to select 
the case studies by using a telephone survey. The sample consisted of 200 completed 
telephone interviews. All 200 SMEs have a minimum of one and a maximum of 99 em-
ployees. The person we spoke to was always a director/owner and the one who takes 
the important decisions. The survey was distributed equally across the sectors industry, 
construction, trade, hotel and catering industry, transport and communication, financial 
services and other services.  
In the first pilot study a short questionnaire was used for selecting the case studies. We 
used a different questionnaire for the telephone survey. During the first pilot study we 
noticed when doing the in-depth interviews that some questions in the 'EIM SME-Panel' 
were not quite clear for all the participants. For this reason we improved and expanded 
the questionnaire to ensure a better selection of the case studies. Beforehand we dis-
tinguished three groups: (1) entrepreneurs with a go-decision, (2) entrepreneurs with a 
no-go-decision and (3) entrepreneurs walking around with one or more ideas or plans 
that could possibly lead to a strategic decision. Therefore, the questionnaire consisted 
of three main topics: go-decisions, no-go decisions and ideas that could possibly lead to 
an important decision. There were some questions about each of the three aspects. 
When the subject was applicable we asked the entrepreneur to give a short description 
of the (latest) go-decision, no-go decision or idea. We also asked for some background 
information about the SME such as the number of employees, legal form, year of start-
up, number of directors/owners. 
 
Results of the telephone survey 
Entrepreneurs are very dynamic when it comes to decision-making. The results of the 
telephone survey show us that 65% of the entrepreneurs we interviewed took some 
kind of decision or has ideas that probably will lead to an important decision in the near 
future. From table 1 we see that more than half of the entrepreneurs questioned took 
an important strategic decision in the past five years. Almost 90% of these entrepre-
neurs were pleased with their decision. We also notice that 9% of the questioned en-
trepreneurs dealt with a no-go decision. Approximately 45% of these entrepreneurs 
said they are glad that they had not gone ahead with their decision. 60% of the entre-
preneurs have ideas or plans that will possibly lead to an important decision. This is a 
clear indication that entrepreneurs continue to search for new ideas and opportunities.  
table 1  Percentages of go-decisions, no-go decisions or ideas that possible lead to 
an important decision 
  Percentage 
Go-decision  54 
No-go decision  9 
Idea or plan  60 
Go-decision or no-go decision or idea or plan  65 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 12   
Selection of the case studies 
Exactly 49 entrepreneurs agreed to have a discussion (face-to-face interview) with one 
of the researchers about their decision-making process. Out of these 49 SMEs we se-
lected twelve SMES for an in-depth interview. Our selection consisted of 6 entrepre-
neurs with a go-decision, 2 SMEs with a no-go-decision and 4 entrepreneurs with ideas 
or plans that possibly will result in a strategic decision. Two female entrepreneurs were 
included in our case study selection because we were also interested in having a 
glimpse of their decision-making process. This time the entrepreneurs were located all 
over the Netherlands. 
 
The case studies 
Using the experience gained from the first series of case studies we formulated a proto-
col. This protocol is explained in four steps: 
 
Step 1:  Confirming the appointment and sending the questionnaire 
The appointments were again confirmed by letter and a questionnaire was en-
closed. The questionnaire used at the in-depth interviews in the first pilot study 
was based partly on Mintzberg's decision-making model (1976). The results of 
the first pilot study showed us that Mintzberg's decision-making model does 
not fit in the decision-making world of SMEs. Because we wanted to verify the 
stages and moments we found in the first pilot study we used another ques-
tionnaire conform these stages and moments. Compared to the first pilot 
study we paid much more attention to the formulation of the idea that finally 
led or will lead to an important strategic decision. The questionnaire contained 
open questions only. 
 
Step 2:  A brief Internet search 
Most enterprises have their own website at their disposal. We use the informa-
tion on the website as background information when preparing the in-depth 
interview, but also in our case report. Where there was no website other 
channels were used to obtain information. Eight firms did not have a website. 
  
Step 3:  The in-depth interview 
During the interview we questioned the entrepreneur about relevant facts and 
motives that finally resulted or will result in the decision.  
 
Step 4:  The case study report 
A considerable amount of information was gathered and we structured this in-
formation in a case report that we returned to the entrepreneur for comments 
or corrections. The corrections and comments were processed in a final report. 
A detailed case report keeps the case study much more alive in the mind of the 
researcher and makes it easier to analyse the case studies. 
 
Two entrepreneurs offered two case studies in one in-depth interview. In the end we 
had 14 case studies at our disposal. In July and August of 2003 we finished 8 case stud-
ies. At the beginning of November 2003 we completed the other 6 case studies. A short 
summary of these case studies is given in Annex II. 
   13 
Analysis of the case studies 
We analysed the case studies by making several qualitative scores. The entrepreneurs' 
answers were categorised and we listed the answers for each category in a table. These 
tables assisted us in interpreting these answers. Before we started the second pilot 
study we formulated six hypotheses (chapter 4) which we were able to support or reject 
more easily by using the results in the qualitative tables.  
We performed an additional literature search the results of which were added to the 
literature overview of the first pilot study. Again we confronted our results with the lit-
erature findings.  15 
3  First pilot study: A provisional description of 
the decision-making process 
From the ten case studies of the first pilot study we discovered that an entrepreneur 
goes through certain stages and crucial moments in the decision-making process. The 
stages and crucial moments, which we shall call provisional for the moment, are as fol-
lows: 
−  stage 1: emergence of an idea 
−  moment 1: trigger and informal decision 
−  stage 2: working out the idea 
−  moment 2: formal decision 
−  stage 3: implementation of the decision. 
 
In this chapter we shall consider these stages and moments. Paragraph 3.1 describes 
how an idea emerges. The first critical moment involves a trigger that results in an in-
formal decision being taken (paragraph 3.2). In paragraph 3.3 we explore how entre-
preneurs work out their ideas after taking the informal decision. Once everything is in 
its right place the entrepreneur takes a formal decision (second moment), which has a 
central place in paragraph 3.4. In the last paragraph of this chapter we look at the last 
stage: implementation of the decision.  
3.1  Stage 1: an idea emerges 
Entrepreneurs are always thinking about the future of their firm and are constantly on 
the look-out for opportunities and threats. They are frequently scanning their environ-
ment - their competitors, their customers, their suppliers or their sector in general. The 
entrepreneurs also examine the internal organisation of the firm, e.g. what is the state 
of the production process, how do the employees perform under the current conditions 
and how profitable is the firm. They also gather information from, for example, trade 
journals, management journals, meetings, courses or the Internet. It is possible that one 
of these items will lead to the birth of an idea. We think that in the ten case studies one 
or more of these information sources were responsible for the idea although it was 
hard to point out the actual source. 
 
The moment at which an idea arises  
In eight out of ten cases it was not possible for us to indicate one particular moment at 
which the idea arose. In none of the cases we could trace one single moment at which 
the entrepreneurs yelled “Eureka”. Rather the entrepreneurs talked about a maturing 
process. The idea slowly penetrates the consciousness of the entrepreneur, who consid-
ers himself as the creator of the idea. These entrepreneurs are almost constantly aware 
of their idea. Box 1 gives two examples. 16   
Box 1  Examples of ideas that are the result of a maturity process 
−  The entrepreneur of a pub serving food noticed that the dishes offered on the 
menu did not differ from any other pubs serving food. The entrepreneur wanted 
to be more distinctive. His idea was to drastically upgrade the menu to the level of 
a haute cuisine restaurant, while still enjoying the ambience of a pub. 
−  The entrepreneur of three supermarkets knew that a supermarket in his vicinity 
was for sale. This supermarket could fall into the hands of a competitor. It took a 
while before he realised that it would be a good idea to buy this supermarket 
himself. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
In two cases we were able to indicate the moment at which the idea arose. These ideas 
arose completely by chance. These two ideas coincide with the moment we call the 
trigger (see paragraph 3.2). One idea came from the entrepreneur himself (see box 2).  
Box 2  Examples of an idea that came from the entrepreneur himself 
The entrepreneur of a firm that cleans the fronts of houses saw that the owner of a 
similar company arranged his succession too late. This made the entrepreneur aware 
that he had to think about this and take measures at an early stage. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
The other idea arose due to external factors (see box 3). 
Box 3  Examples of an idea that arose due to external factors 
An entrepreneur who runs an international transport company in the Benelux, received 
a telephone call from the international owner to look for a firm that was suitable for a 
take-over. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
Surprisingly, when it comes to formulating the idea there is no place for any advisors, 
such as accountants, notaries or lawyers. This phase of dealing with the idea mainly 
takes place in the mind of the entrepreneur (or entrepreneurs, if there are associates). 
We received the impression that the associate who produced the idea takes a dominant 
lead. This is a provisional finding only because we did not question any associates. 
 
Attractiveness of the idea 
The idea can be attractive, or in some cases very attractive, from the first moment on 
(see box 4). During the process the entrepreneur becomes more and more aware of 
why the initial idea is a really good idea. Perhaps the entrepreneurs had some experi-
ments in mind to sound out the idea. It is possible that some ideas were killed in this 
way although we did not question the entrepreneurs explicitly on this subject. However, 
we saw that the entrepreneurs are gradually convinced that the idea needs to be im-
plemented. The idea develops into a strong motive (or a set of motives), which requires 
action. There was one entrepreneur who did not find the idea attractive at first, but as 
it went on his opinion changed. At the end he was convinced that the idea was good.   17 
Box 4  Examples of reasons why the idea is attractive 
−  The investment made by a printing firm in a modern silk-screen printing machine 
was attractive from the first moment on. The quality of the new machine would 
be much better than the old one. With this new machine the printing office is 
able to stay in the top segment of the market. 
−  A civil engineering agency realised that some diversification was necessary in order 
to receive enough orders in the near future. This diversification could be realised 
by accepting the offer of a take-over by an international firm but this would mean 
the end of the civil engineering agency. For this reason the entrepreneur devel-
oped a new plan and the civil engineering agency started up a joint venture with a 
foreign civil engineering agency. In this way it could still operate independently 
and survive.  
−  A shipping agent with a medium-sized transport business received a telephone call 
from the director of an international transport business who gave the manager in-
structions to look for a suitable candidate for a take-over and to manage this firm. 
The shipping agent did not like the idea of becoming a manager of a transport 
business at first, but now he is very enthusiastic about his new job. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
Argumentation of the idea 
We questioned the entrepreneurs after they had implemented their decision. Therefore 
we need to realise that in this stage the entrepreneurs could reason differently about 
their ideas. The entrepreneurs were able to present good arguments to support the 
idea. We are not sure whether the entrepreneurs would talk about their idea in the 
same way as they as they did when they were in the stage of becoming aware of the 
idea. 
The entrepreneurs thought very carefully about the rational argumentation of the idea. 
At the same time intuition and emotion play an important role in their argumentation, 
as the entrepreneurs frankly admit. It is quite possible that at first emotions are domi-
nant and that later on they think through their idea carefully in a more rational way. In 
seven case studies it was hard to recognise any emotional dominance, because the en-
trepreneurs were obviously reasoning in retrospect. Three entrepreneurs acknowledged 
the dominance of emotional arguments such as 'I'm very proud of my company' or 'it's 
nice doing this too'. These emotional arguments were complemented with rational ar-
guments. Because entrepreneurs think a lot about their arguments we suspect that they 
weigh up the alternatives in their minds. As a consequence the argumentation of the 
idea becomes more rational.  
 
Alternative ideas 
In most case studies we could not find any alternative ideas. However, two entrepre-
neurs spoke about their alternative plans (see box 5) which, however, they chose not to 
go through with. 
Box 5  Examples of alternative ideas 
−  The entrepreneur of a research agency has chosen for the establishment of a joint 
venture instead of expanding his own research agency. 
−  A civil engineering agency also decided to set up the establishment of a joint ven-
ture. This time the alternative was the buy-out of the firm by a large civil engi-
neering agency. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 18   
The first idea was the best for those entrepreneurs without alternatives. This is again an 
indication that feelings play an important part. Apparently the first idea is so attractive 
that the entrepreneurs are not aware of alternatives. Because this idea is so dominant it 
is perhaps hard for entrepreneurs to find alternative ideas. The entrepreneurs consid-
ered this stage as closed. 
It is remarkable that none of the entrepreneurs wants to abandon his idea at any mo-
ment during the process. Apparently they find the alternative unattractive. Sometimes 
this is understandable because the entrepreneurs are under pressure to solve a problem 
or to reduce an area of tension. But even in cases where the entrepreneur is not under 
any pressure, the possibility of abandonment does not arise. 
 
Idea and trigger 
Despite the strength and maturity of the idea, the elaboration of the idea rarely comes 
automatically. In nine out of the ten case studies something extra is needed: a trigger. 
The period between idea and trigger differs from case to case. Some entrepreneurs 
need only a couple of weeks whereas others need a year or even more. As mentioned 
previously in two case studies the idea emerged at the same moment that the trigger 
occurred. This means that the elaboration of the idea began immediately and the en-
trepreneur did not require any time to allow his idea to mature. 
3.2  Moment 1: trigger and informal decision 
The trigger is the direct stimuli for the entrepreneurs to take action and elaborate their 
idea. In one case study the entrepreneur stated that he could not remember anything 
that worked as a trigger In the nine other case studies we did perceive a trigger. In 
seven case studies the trigger came from the outside world. The trigger can be direct or 
indirect. If the idea is immature a strong direct trigger is necessary before the entrepre-
neur takes any action (see box 6 for examples). 
Box 6  Example of a direct trigger 
−  The wife of a sound engineer arrived home with a film that had to be edited. This 
seriously encouraged the sound engineer to research the possibility of doing some 
film editing.  
−  The entrepreneur of an installation company heard that some of his employees 
wanted to do some other work in addition to their normal work. This triggered 
the entrepreneur to fulfil his idea of starting-up an additional firm. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
A relatively mature idea needs only a rather indirect trigger. In this case there is not an 
obvious continuation of the mental process until then. It concerns an indirect, tempo-
rary and unique event. Most of the times the trigger occurs accidentally. We give a brief 
description of a few indirect triggers in box 7.   19 
Box 7  Examples of indirect triggers 
−  A research agency and a communication firm had the idea of co-operating 
through a joint venture. Although the idea had existed for a long time nothing 
had been done. A candidate that applied for a job at the communication agency 
had previously worked for a research agency. This candidate was the perfect per-
son to manage a joint venture between the communication agency and the re-
search agency. Her application triggered both agencies to act. 
−  Two employees of a printing firm became the owners of the business. For them it 
was the moment that they had been waiting for to realise their idea and to buy a 
modern silk-screen printing machine. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
We found it quite surprising that entrepreneurs experience such a decisive moment like 
a trigger as relatively unimportant compared to the major thread in their thoughts. 
When we asked the entrepreneurs about the crucial moments in their thought process 
they could not indicate such a moment. Also in the case study where no trigger was 
found there was no crucial moment. The entrepreneurs talked about a period in which 
the idea slowly gained strength. Of course, in the two case studies where the idea and 
the trigger coincide there is no such period. 
The trigger leads to immediate action. The action taken by the entrepreneur after the 
trigger occurs shows us that the entrepreneur took his informal decision. In box 8 we 
mention a few examples of informal decisions. 
Box 8  Examples of informal decisions 
Informal decisions are for example: 
−  purchasing a fourth supermarket 
−  upgrading the menu 
−  investing in editing equipment 
−  creating a joint venture 
−  taking-over of a medium-sized transportation company  
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
It is hard for the entrepreneur to let go of his idea after this particular moment even if 
obstacles have to be overcome. The moment the trigger occurs the entrepreneur takes 
some direct action that eventually leads to the final decision. The informal decision is 
not put in writing. It is an intention in the entrepreneur's mind or a verbal agreement 
between associates. 
3.3  Stage 2: working out the idea 
After taking the informal decision the entrepreneurs elaborate their idea. They look at 
alternatives and consult advisors and banks. The entrepreneurs also bear in mind that 
there are risks. All this makes the elaboration of the idea a complex matter and, as a 
consequence, entrepreneurs often have to overcome obstacles. Other persons that op-
erate in the vicinity of the entrepreneur gain more influence in this stage of the deci-
sion-making process. We shall take a closer look at each of the above-mentioned top-
ics. 
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Alternatives 
When the entrepreneur is working out his idea alternative solutions are considered. 
However, the original idea remains unaffected. Box 9 shows some examples of alterna-
tives. 
Box 9  Examples of alternatives 
The alternatives include, for example 
−  finding a subcontractor or a favourable financial agreement 
−  the choice between various types of machines or software packages 
−  dishes that are going to be served  
−  a location for a new establishment. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
When the entrepreneurs consider the alternatives it appears that economic rationality is 
very important. The entrepreneur considers which alternative is most beneficial in terms 
of costs and benefits.  
 
Role of advisors and banks 
As mentioned above, advisors come into play at this stage of the decision-making proc-
ess, although not every entrepreneur consults an advisor. By advisors we mean ac-
countants, banks, lawyers, notaries and consultants. These advisors do not have any in-
fluence on the idea and are not given any chance of offering alternative ideas. 
Box 10  Example of the role of advisors 
One entrepreneur received unasked advice about the idea. The entrepreneur acknowl-
edged the advice and put it to one side. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
Usually advisors compile alternative solutions (within the boundaries of the idea). Some 
entrepreneurs admit that they depend very much on these advisors to consider the al-
ternatives and for the specific elaboration of their profession. Otherwise we have the 
distinct impression that entrepreneurs are not very interested in the details provided by 
the advisors. All they want is for the advisors to help them implement their idea.  
The position of banks is in our opinion remarkable. Entrepreneurs wish to have as little 
as possible to do with banks, because they do not want to be dependent on them. On 
the other hand, the banks are reticent even though there is an important role for them 
to play. This mutual aversion could perhaps result in the informal decision being unsuc-
cessful. 
Consulting advisors and banks assist entrepreneurs by providing information in the form 
of analyses on which to found their informal decision. For four firms these analyses 
were restricted to financial or legal aspects only. Two entrepreneurs drew up a business 
plan. The four other entrepreneurs did not make use of any advisors. In these case stud-
ies there were no financial or legal complications. 
 
Risks 
The impact of risk-awareness on the final decision appeared to be very low. Seven en-
trepreneurs had little or no doubt about their strategic decision. The entrepreneurs who 
found their idea very attractive from the start had the least doubt about their decision. 
Three other entrepreneurs did have considerable doubts about their decision because of 
the high risk involved. Nevertheless these risks did not play an important part in their   21 
final decision. Entrepreneurs are able to keep track of all the risks even if they are large. 
They balance the risks against the benefits that the decision brings before they finally 
decide. Box 11 gives some examples of risks that entrepreneurs have to take into ac-
count during their decision-making process. 
Box 11  Examples of risks that entrepreneurs have to bear 
−  Although the owner of three supermarkets decided to buy a fourth supermarket. 
It was a high-risk decision. The supermarket included a unhygienic and unprofit-
able bakery. Nevertheless the entrepreneur rebuilt this bakery. The reorganisation 
of the bakery was expensive and it is still hard for the supermarket to make a 
profit.  
−  The entrepreneur of an installation firm took some risks when starting-up a new 
subsidiary. A large telecommunication provider who is a customer of the installa-
tion firm could decide to take his custom elsewhere, because the SME could be-
come a competitor. As the entrepreneur did not want to lose his largest customer, 
he decided to set up a subsidiary. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
Complexity 
During the elaboration of the informal decision four SMEs had to deal with complex 
situations according to the entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs all executed financial or 
legal analyses or formulated a business plan. The more complex the decision the more 
analyses needed. However, intuition also plays a part in complex decision-making per-
haps because it is hard for the entrepreneur to gain complete insight into this decision. 
Complexity concerns mainly the financial obstacles that an entrepreneur has to over-
come. When the entrepreneur is elaborating the financial implications it appears to be 
much tougher than once thought. On the other hand it appears that when there is no 
financial obstacle then the elaboration of the idea is quite simple. 
 
Obstacles 
Two SMEs did not meet any obstacle during their decision-making process. Three en-
trepreneurs came up against some small obstacles. Substantial obstacles were encoun-
tered by five SMEs. Four entrepreneurs stated that the obstacles had to do with the fi-
nancial solution (see box 12). 
Box 12  Examples of obstacles that have to be overcome 
−  Financial obstacles are, for example, difficulties in getting credit from the bank or 
the withdrawal of a possible financier.  
−  Non-financial obstacles are, for example, delivery problems and the attitude of 
customers. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
Most obstacles were overcome with great enthusiasm, because the entrepreneurs ac-
tively searched for a solution to deal with the obstacle. This is directly related to the at-
tractiveness of the idea that motivates the entrepreneurs to hold on. The right timing 
plays an important role in their solution. None of the entrepreneurs was in a hurry to 
deal with the obstacles. In some case studies the entrepreneurs waited as long as was 
needed for the obstacle to disappear. 
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Influence of other persons in the environment 
It seems as if the entrepreneur is the only person who really matters during the elabora-
tion process. When there are one or more associates these also have substantial influ-
ence, but there is one leader who drags the other associates along with him. All other 
parties involved have minor influence.  
Employees do not participate in the decision-making process although they sometimes 
know what is going on. In one case study the influence of the employees was clearly 
noticeable, because they formed the trigger for the entrepreneur to work out his idea. 
We do not exclude that in some other case studies the employees had more influence 
then the entrepreneur admitted. In some other case studies the decision-making proc-
ess was strictly no-need-to-know for the employees. In these cases they could not influ-
ence the decision-making process. 
The entrepreneur's wife or girl friend has no influence on the decision-making process 
according to the entrepreneurs. At the most she does not stand in the way of the en-
trepreneur and gives him enough space to continue working out the idea. We do not 
know how the partners of the entrepreneurs view their influence.  
The influence of customers is also almost unnoticeable. In one case study the customers 
appeared to be the trigger. In some other case studies the entrepreneur did not explic-
itly take into account the probable reaction of the customers to his decision.  
 
Influence from the public authorities 
There appeared to be no direct influence by policy makers or public authorities on the 
decision-making process, for example through subsidies, tax benefits or educational 
programs. Entrepreneurs dislike the administrative burdens that accompany the applica-
tion for subsidies or tax benefits. A couple of times it was evident that entrepreneurs 
would welcome some stimulating policy on certain aspects, aspects such as reduction of 
entry barriers, removing unfair competition or a good infrastructure. 
3.4  Moment 2: Formal decision 
At a certain moment the entrepreneurs set up a formal agreement concerning their de-
cision or take the first step to execute the decision. We regarded the moment at which 
the entrepreneur takes one of these two steps as the moment when the entrepreneur 
takes the formal decision. After this moment there is no way back for the entrepreneur.  
 
Recording of the final decision 
Eight entrepreneurs have their decision in writing. In these cases agreements of a legal 
and/or financial nature are involved. For two entrepreneurs (see box 13) who do not 
have their decision in writing the first step of implementation can be considered to be 
the moment of the final decision. Before that moment the entrepreneur has no obliga-
tions. 
Box 13  Examples of how to recognise the formal decision 
Two entrepreneurs did not set up a formal agreement to record their decision. The 
first steps to implement their decision were: 
−  the purchase of equipment and software by a sound engineer 
−  drawing up the new menu by the owner of a pub serving food. 
  Source: EIM, 2004.   23 
Crucial motives 
In all case studies there was a single motive that was very dominant and was finally de-
cisive in the decision to go ahead. Examples are presented in box 14. 
Box 14  Examples of crucial motives 
−  The owner of three supermarkets decided to buy a fourth supermarket before any 
competitor could buy this supermarket in his environment.  
−  To stay at the top a silk-screen printing company had to buy a new silk-screen 
printer. 
−  The strategic vision of an international owner of a transport business was the cru-
cial motive to take-over a Dutch transport business.  
−  A communication agency pushed the entrepreneur of a research company to ex-
pand his research capacity in order to co-operate and this resulted in a new joint 
venture. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
For seven SMEs the motive came from inside the firm, for the other three SMEs the de-
cisive motive came from outside the SME. The decisive moment has, in all cases, an ob-
vious economic principle. In most case studies we could also recognise some non-
economic elements, like being proud of the SME or the need for a new challenge. 
The strategic decisions of the entrepreneurs have different natures that stress their di-
versity. We categorised the strategic decisions in two categories. The strategic decisions 
concerning a change in the organisation of the SME and investments in products and 
processes. In short, in seven out of ten case studies we talked to entrepreneurs who 
made changes in their organisation and three cases that involved the strategic decision 
of investment in products or processes. 
3.5  Stage 3: implementation of the decision 
After the entrepreneur took the formal decision he was able to implement his decision. 
The implementation of the decision was not plain sailing for four entrepreneurs. At the 
time of the implementation of the decision difficulties arose and those were more seri-
ous then previously thought. These problems resulted in financial difficulties. Eventually 
these problems were solved although for most firms the consequences were unpleas-
ant. In all other case studies the implementation of the decision went quite smoothly, 
although three entrepreneurs did admit that the implementation was not as fast as they 
thought in advance. In box 15 some examples are presented that show us how entre-
preneurs implemented their decision. 
Box 15  Examples of obstacles that have to be conquered 
−  Because of the expensive reorganisation it was a few years before the supermar-
ket was profitable. Large losses made the financing of a take-over much more dif-
ficult.  
−  An establishment went bankrupt because the market collapsed and as a conse-
quence the parent company has some large debts.  
−  The entrepreneurs of a printing company bought a new silk-screen printing ma-
chine. The capacity improved and the products are of much higher quality.  
−  The entrepreneur of a pub serving food suddenly changed his menu. Customers 
were surprised at first, but now really like the haute-cuisine food and the ambi-
ence of the restaurant. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 24   
Degree of satisfaction 
All the entrepreneurs are satisfied about their decision. They admit that they at least 
tried to make the best out of it. If they had not taken their decision they certainly would 
have had some regrets later on, because an opportunity would have been lost. This was 
also the case for entrepreneurs whose decision had less favourable results. 
Because enough time has passed since the formal decision was taken it was possible for 
the entrepreneurs we interviewed to judge the results of their decision. Five entrepre-
neurs were found to be very pleased with their decision. Three entrepreneurs are con-
tent with the decision, but have some marginal notes. These marginal notes were 
solved by: 
Box 16  Examples of solving marginal notes 
−  trying to be more cautious with a fifth take-over 
−  having conversations with the manager of the joint venture 
−  the sound engineer stopping editing. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
Two entrepreneurs openly state that the decision did not have the result they expected 
although they are still convinced that their idea is good and will not give up so easily. 
These entrepreneurs are trying to correct their mistakes. They have no doubts about the 
idea, but consider the way in which the decision was implemented to be responsible for 
mistakes. 
 
Current state of the SME 
Three SMES are very pleased with the current state of the firm and are generating a 
much higher turnover and profit than before. Three SMEs were able to attain their end 
goals, but they are hoping for a slight improvement in turnover and profit. The decision 
led to a business interruption for the other three firms (see box 17). 
Box 17  Examples of SMEs where the decision has led to an interruption 
−  A civil engineering agency states that the co-operation is unsatisfactory. They have 
put a great deal of effort into the co-operation but the results are marginal. The 
civil engineering agency is looking for a new partner.  
−  The sound engineer has temporarily stopped editing tapes, because it takes too 
much time.  
−  An installation company is bankrupt. Current orders are being handled by the par-
ent company. 
Source: EIM, 2004.   25 
4  Second pilot study: Hypotheses 
In the previous chapter we described a first impression of the decision-making process 
within SMEs. However, some aspects remained unanswered or needed to be investi-
gated more thoroughly. We did this by setting up six hypotheses. To carry out a pre-
liminary test of these hypotheses we interviewed another series of entrepreneurs in a 
second pilot study. The results are discussed in this chapter. In each of the following 
paragraphs one single hypothesis is central. 
4.1  Hypothesis 1: alternative ideas are not considered 
After the first pilot study we assumed that the entrepreneurs did not consider any alter-
native ideas. We were also aware that we had not paid special attention to this issue 
and therefore we wanted to hypothesize this. We formulated hypothesis 1. 
 
Hypothesis 1:   In their decision-making process entrepreneurs do not consider  
alternative ideas. 
 
We asked entrepreneurs whether alternative ideas played a part in decision-making and 
found alternative ideas in more case studies then we expected. The examples in box 18 
show why hypothesis 1 probably has to be rejected. 
Box 18  Examples of alternative ideas 
−  The owners of a camping site decided to build a brand new bungalow park on a 
piece of land that they owned but that was hardly ever used. They also had the 
idea of expanding the camping site. The local authorities disagreed and so this 
idea was rejected. 
−  A confectioner considered three ideas, namely making his own chocolate, selling 
confectionery instead of having a lunchroom and baking his own bread. The last 
idea was dismissed very quickly, because the entire bakery had to be rebuilt. Mak-
ing his own chocolate would require a lot of effort to learn this trade The idea of 
selling more confectionery remained. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
When we look at the two examples in box 17 we see that the confectioner picked the 
most attractive idea and at the camping site they chose the idea, which the local au-
thority also preferred. In one case study the idea was not attractive at first (see box 19). 
In all other case studies the ideas were attractive from the beginning. 
Box 19  Example of an idea that was unattractive from the start 
Two associates had a hard time working together with their third associate. Because 
they started their firm as good friends it was hard for these two associates to buy-out 
the third one. They were very patient, but finally the situation became unbearable so 
they had to inform the third associate about the problem. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 26   
We noticed that entrepreneurs do not stare blindly at just one idea. In fact, they are 
aware of other competitive ideas and also consider these ideas. In the case studies 
where we do not know whether the entrepreneur had alternative ideas it is possible 
that there were alternative ideas, but they could not remember what they were. In fact, 
probably all entrepreneurs had alternative ideas but these were written off at an early 
stage or totally crowded out. We have seen in the first pilot study that it was hard to 
distinguish the idea generating process of the entrepreneurs and how they evaluate al-
ternative ideas. In the second pilot study we paid some extra attention to the idea un-
derlying the decision-making process. 
We also found some additional results related to hypothesis one that will be discussed 
in the remainder of this section. One entrepreneur admitted that he frequently does 
some brainstorming and makes visualisations through which ideas come to life. There 
are several channels through which an entrepreneur can obtain the necessary informa-
tion that eventually leads to the idea. In box 20 we see that the entrepreneurs have dif-
ferent information channels that could possibly lead to an idea. 
Box 20  Examples of the information-seeking process 
−  An insurance entrepreneur has a great deal of knowledge and experience of his 
profession. He is also consciously aware of what is happening in the economy. He 
regularly talks to other insurers.  
−  The owners of a snack bar read trade journals, but admit they receive most infor-
mation from demonstrations.  
−  An information centre that wanted to set up a data warehouse obtained more in-
formation from similar firms that already had a data warehouse. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
In seven out of the fourteen case studies the entrepreneurs said that the idea came by 
chance (box 20). In these cases the idea itself came from someone else (external factor). 
The entrepreneurs reacted very quickly to this idea and almost immediately after the 
idea emerged they recognised the opportunity. Intuition, but also emotion, plays an im-
portant part in dealing with such ideas and these emotions are dominant in the begin-
ning. The feeling has to be good otherwise the idea is rejected immediately.  
Box 21  Examples of ideas that emerged by chance 
Examples of ideas that emerged by chance are: 
−  a telephone call from a well-known international firm to become a team partner 
or 
−  the demonstration of a new computerised cash-desk system at a fair that inter-
ested a snack bar. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
Other entrepreneurs argued that idea arose because they had to solve a problem. These 
entrepreneurs are more conscious about the idea (box 22). Once the entrepreneur has 
conceived the idea, the idea gradually matures in the mind of the entrepreneurs until an 
opportunity comes along.   27 
Box 22  Examples of ideas to solve a problem 
Examples of ideas to solve a problem are: 
−  the search for a suitable take-over candidate because of the nearing retirement of 
the entrepreneur or 
−  another way of organising data to meet the increasing demand. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
No-go decisions take place in the first stage of the decision-making process. Especially 
entrepreneurs with a no-go decision have alternative ideas. Entrepreneurs with a no-go 
decision find the idea attractive at first, but gradually it becomes less attractive. Mostly 
this is due to problems that the entrepreneur encounters. The entrepreneur does not 
wish to put a lot of effort into solving these problems so the idea becomes unattractive 
and eventually reaches a point where the idea is rejected. Box 23 shows us two exam-
ples of no-go-decisions.  
Box 23  Examples of a no-go decision 
−  It was, for instance, very attractive at first for an insurance company to work with 
a fourth associate. This fourth associate had a large network, which the insurance 
company could use to expand its clientele. During this potential associate's trial 
period at the insurance office one of the associates began to feel uncomfortable 
and this feeling increased. A few weeks later the other associates complained 
about the same problem and they decided to call it all off. 
−  The entrepreneurs of a snack bar decided to their his idea to buy a computer con-
trolled cash desk system. Teaching the female entrepreneur how to work with 
such a system would prove too time consuming. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
Entrepreneurs with a no-go decision were able to formulate an alternative idea almost 
immediately. This alternative idea is responsible for a go-decision (see box 24). The al-
ternative ideas that entrepreneurs produce after a no-go decision are additional evi-
dence to reject hypothesis 1. 
Box 24  Examples of a no-go decision followed by an alternative idea 
−  Instead of buying a computer controlled cash desk system the entrepreneurs of a 
snack bar decided to buy a new oven.  
−  An insurance office cancelled the buy-in of a fourth associate, but have plans to 
co-operate with a real estate agent. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
After the alternative ideas have been dropped the idea that remains gains strength. The 
entrepreneurs are gradually convinced that the idea needs to be executed just as we 
experienced in the first pilot study. Eventually the idea develops into a strong motive (or 
a set of motives), which requires action. 
4.2  Hypothesis 2: a trigger is responsible for the informal decision 
Usually the elaboration of the idea does not come automatically. In the first pilot study 
we discovered that something extra was needed. That something we call a trigger. In 
the first pilot study we distinguished two types of triggers: direct and indirect. When an 28   
idea is relatively weak there has to be a strong trigger that spurs the entrepreneur into 
action but a relatively strong idea needs only a weak indirect trigger. We wanted to in-
vestigate the role of the trigger and the result is hypothesis 2.  
 
Hypothesis 2:  An informal decision is taken after some kind of event (the trigger).  
  If the idea of the entrepreneur is comparatively mature an indirect or 
weak trigger will lead to the informal decision. If the idea is compara-
tively immature the informal decision is taken after a strong trigger 
that has a strong relation with the idea. 
 
In each case study we could distinguish such a trigger. The entrepreneurs do not pay 
much attention to these triggers. It was hard for two entrepreneurs to recall any such 
trigger. Only when the idea and the trigger occur simultaneously is the entrepreneur 
aware of the trigger. Just as in the first pilot study we noticed in the second pilot study 
that the period between the idea and the trigger differed in each case study. The nature 
of the trigger varies (see box 25). 
Box 25  Examples of triggers  
Examples of triggers are: 
−  a leak in the water supply system 
−  getting a tenancy agreement and 
−  not being able to formulate the vision of the company for the coming year. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
In two case studies the idea and the trigger occurred simultaneously. Once the entre-
preneur is aware of this trigger it is hard for him to let go of his idea. Sometimes some 
obstacles have to be removed but the entrepreneurs are convinced that they can over-
come these obstacles. All the time the idea remains very powerful. The entrepreneurs 
do not let go of their idea after the trigger and start elaborating their idea from that 
moment on. They take actions that will eventually lead to other actions. We consider 
the moment of the trigger as the moment at which the informal decision is taken.  
Hypothesis 2 surely holds for the case studies in which the idea and the trigger occur 
simultaneously. If the entrepreneur did not have any thoughts in the direction of the 
idea then the trigger has to be very powerful before he reacts to it. The external idea is 
the trigger in these cases. We found that the trigger in these cases was so strong that it 
finally led to an important strategic decision by the entrepreneur. We also noticed that 
these triggers came from the outside world (box 26). 
Box 26  Examples of direct triggers 
−  A developer of bungalow parks visited the owners of a camping site and inter-
ested them in building a bungalow park on a piece of land that they never use.  
−  The entrepreneurs at a snack bar saw a computer-controlled cash desk system at a 
demonstration and this triggered them to find more information about such a sys-
tem.  
−  A confectioner received a telephone call from a commercial agent with the offer 
to sell his company's confectionery. 
  Source: EIM, 2004.   29 
Other ideas are more mature and these are the result of a process in which the idea 
gradually matures inside the mind of the entrepreneur. Mostly these ideas develop to 
deal with to some kind of problem. Only a weak trigger is necessary to move these en-
trepreneurs into action. We illustrate this in box 27.  
Box 27  Examples of indirect triggers  
−  A dental technician knows that he will have to retire from business within a cou-
ple of years. The idea had been milling around in his head for quite a while and 
was pretty mature. It was his wife who said that he had to arrange his succession 
well in advance.  
−  Various little irritations had occurred in the past couple of years in a multimedia 
firm. Two entrepreneurs found it was interfering with their work A third associate 
was finding it difficult to explain how he saw the future of the firm and, even af-
ter a holiday, he was still unable to do so. The two other associates considered 
this to be the last straw and doubted his commitment to the firm. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
Using the examples in box 27 we showed that hypothesis 2 also holds for more mature 
ideas. Hypothesis 2 is supported by our cases.  
4.3  Hypothesis 3: lack of influence of other persons 
After the informal decision has been taken the entrepreneur takes action. He works out 
his idea and considers alternatives, risks and overcomes the obstacles. Once everything 
has been worked out the entrepreneur takes his final decision. In the first pilot study we 
discovered that the entrepreneur is the only person who really matters in the decision-
making process. We investigated this more thoroughly in the second pilot study and 
formulated hypothesis 3. 
  
Hypothesis 3:  In SMEs with a owner-manager (or owner-managers) the decision-
making process is rarely influenced by other persons that are directly 
or indirectly involved.  
 
One entrepreneur was very direct in giving his answer to the question whether the deci-
sion-making process was influenced by other persons (box 28). 
Box 28  Example of a reaction on the influence of other persons 
When we asked one entrepreneur about the impact of other persons on the decision-
making process he answered: “I hardly ever consult 'outsiders' if it concerns drastic 
decisions”. He admitted that everything was discussed within his office. If he consults 
colleague entrepreneurs then he quotes his own but indirectly inquires how they 
would react to a specific situation. Afterwards he picks out what he thinks is relevant. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
In firms with several co-owners it is always the case that all the owners are informed 
about the decision that is going to be taken. They are all involved in the process. Just as 
in the first pilot study we found that one entrepreneur takes the lead. In some cases the 
entrepreneurs were husband and wife. When the entrepreneurs were not husband and 
wife it was usually still the case that the entrepreneur's partner knows what is going 
on. These partners often have their own opinion about the situation, but they do not 30   
stand in the way when the entrepreneur takes his decision. In one case study the wife 
of the entrepreneur played a crucial role in the decision-making process (box 29). 
Box 29  Example of the role of the wife of an entrepreneur 
As a real estate agent the wife of an entrepreneur told her husband about an historic 
farm. Together they went to look at the farm and decided that they wanted to live 
there as well. The entrepreneur's wife also stimulated the entrepreneur to move his 
firm to the farm. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
We spoke to entrepreneurs that come from a family of entrepreneurs. They talk to their 
family about their business and decisions because they feel understood by their family 
members. We noticed that eventually the entrepreneurs go their own way and take 
their own decision.  
The role of employees is usually almost negligible. In some case studies the entrepre-
neur informs the employees about the decision, but according to the entrepreneur the 
employees have no influence on the decision-making process. In one case study the en-
trepreneur talked a lot with the IT-manager. This was because the entrepreneur knew 
little about data warehouses. But in the end it was the entrepreneur who decided that 
it was time to implement a data warehouse.  
Advisors like accountants, tax consultants or notaries help the entrepreneur to elaborate 
the idea (see box 30). 
Box 30  Examples of the role of advisors 
−  An accountant helped a multimedia firm to buy-out a third associate.  
−  A salesman gave advice about a new oven at a snack bar. 
−  An information centre consulted a software design agency about the introduction 
of a data warehouse. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
As in the first pilot study there was again no influence from the public authorities. 
We conclude this section by saying that we have noticed that other associates have the 
most powerful influence on the decision. Other persons can play a role, but the entre-
preneur is always responsible for the final decision. 
4.4  Hypothesis 4: informal versus formal decision 
In chapter 3 we described the formal decision as the moment at which there is no way 
back. However, we found that there is almost no way back even at the moment the 
trigger occurs and the informal decision is made. We wanted to investigate, based upon 
a new set of case studies, whether the informal and formal decision differed and 
formulated hypothesis 4. 
 
Hypothesis 4:  The moment of the informal decision is the decisive moment in the 
strategic decision-making process. The formal decision is therefore 
not considerably different from the informal decision. 
 
The new series of case studies offered us better insight in the way the entrepreneur 
takes the formal decision. After the informal decision every entrepreneur has his own 
way of elaborating the idea and dealing with possible obstacles. At some point there is   31 
a decisive moment that convinces him to take the formal decision. These decisive mo-
ments vary across the case studies, examples being discontent about the current job, 
lack of confidence, recognising the opportunity for further growth and the success of 
confectionery in other bakeries.  
All the time one idea is dominant and the entrepreneur is convinced that this idea will 
be a success. For this reason it is very hard for the entrepreneur to let go of the idea. 
The entrepreneur works out the informal decision in such a way that the idea will be 
executed in the end, even though it can be very tough sometimes. In the long run the 
informal and formal decisions do not differ from each other. The cases seem to support 
hypothesis 4. 
4.5  Hypothesis 5: majority of decisions lead to success 
After the formal decision the entrepreneur thinks the time is right to actually execute 
his decision. Because all strategic decisions have a different nature each entrepreneur 
implements the decision in his own manner (see box 31).  
Box 31  Examples of the way an entrepreneur implements the decision 
−  A firm that deals in special glass has become the team partner of an international 
firm and this resulted in changing the name of the firm.  
−  Two entrepreneurs started a joint venture in insurance and rebuilt the office of 
one of the entrepreneurs. 
−  A confectioner closed his lunchroom and bought a new refrigerator and showcase 
to sell more confectionery. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
The first pilot study showed us that not every entrepreneur was pleased about the re-
sults of the decision. However, we expect that the majority of entrepreneurs will con-
sider the decision to be a success (hypothesis 5). 
 
Hypothesis 5:  The quality of strategic decisions at SMEs with a managerial business 
owner (or owners) is such that a majority of the decisions will lead to 
success. In the cases where there is no success it is hard to blame this 
on the quality of the decision.  
 
It was not possible in all cases to say whether the entrepreneurs were satisfied or not, 
because they have not yet reached the point at which the decision is executed. This 
holds for five case studies. We asked these entrepreneurs whether they are satisfied up 
to this point. Three entrepreneurs are content so far. One entrepreneur is still too inse-
cure to be satisfied and one entrepreneur states that he will be satisfied once every-
thing is in order. 
However, the majority of decisions were executed and the entrepreneurs have an opin-
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Box 32  Examples of the way an entrepreneur implements the decision 
−  Now the third associate has left the multimedia firm the communication between 
the other two associates has improved by 100%. Although it was hard for them 
they are very pleased with their decision.  
−  Another entrepreneur is content with the decision about the joint venture al-
though the integration of the two insurance offices did not progress as quickly as 
he expected. 
  Source: EIM, 2004. 
Seven entrepreneurs are satisfied with the decision. Two entrepreneurs are content with 
their decision although the result was not what they expected.  
Based on the two pilot studies we see that the majority of decisions turned out to be a 
success for the SME. The SMEs that are satisfied only to a certain extent admit that this 
is entirely due to the implementation of the decision. They are convinced that the idea 
is good. We conclude this section by supporting hypothesis 5. 
4.6  Hypothesis 6: stages and moments apply to all decisions 
We formulated a provisional description of the stages and moments based upon the 
results of the first pilot study. We wondered if we would also find these stages and 
moments when we interviewed other entrepreneurs. In the previous sections of this 
chapter we hypothesized some elements of the decision-making process. As a conclu-
sion we want to formulate one consistent model concerning decision-making. Therefore 
we also found it necessary to hypothesize the following: 
 
Hypothesis 6:  The stages and moments in the decision-making process (idea – in-
formal decision – elaboration – formal decision – execution) apply to 
every SME with a managerial business owner (or some owners) in all 
sectors in all size classes en for all kinds of strategic decision-making. 
 
Although the case studies dealt with varying decisions, the stages and moments were 
applicable to all of them. We interviewed many entrepreneurs across seven sectors in-
dustry, construction, trade, hotel and catering, transport and communication, business 
services and other services and three size classes: 2-9 employees, 10-49 employees and 
50-99 employees. Based on the 24 case studies in the two pilot studies we were able to 
distinguish the three stages and two moments each time. For the time being we sup-
port this hypothesis. In a future study this insight will be tested in a large quantitative 
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5 The  decision-making  process 
The two pilot studies offered us ample information to model the decision-making proc-
ess in SMEs. In chapter 3 we saw that the decision-making process may be conceived to 
consist of three stages and two crucial moments. First, there is the stage where the idea 
arises. This stage is followed by the moment that there is a trigger and the informal de-
cision is taken. The next stage consists of working out the idea. After the entrepreneur 
has elaborated the idea thoroughly the second moment occurs: taking the formal deci-
sion. The last stage consists of the implementation of the decision in the organisation. 
We considered this a provisional description of the decision-making process at SMEs. 
We wanted to hypothesize some aspects of this provisional model and so a second pilot 
study was carried out, that provided us with additional insight in the decision-making 
process through which we are able to expand our provisional model: the decision-
making process. In this chapter we put all our findings together into one single descrip-
tion of the decision-making process at SMEs. 
 
Generating the idea 
The entrepreneur continually scans his environment, absorbs information and also looks 
at what is happening inside the firm. Generally speaking ideas emerge by chance or be-
cause a problem has to be solved. The ideas that emerge by chance are almost always 
ideas that are influenced by external factors. In other words someone else is actually 
responsible for the idea and discusses it with the entrepreneur. At first intuition and 
feelings play a key role in supporting or rejecting this idea. The feeling has to be good 
otherwise the entrepreneur will reject the idea immediately. Later on the entrepreneur 
thinks about the idea more seriously. At this stage the idea gains more strength. Entre-
preneurs that create an idea to solve a problem are more aware of the idea. The idea 
also gains strength as time passes. The strength is a combination of the business per-
spective and the good feeling that the idea evokes. An idea that is full of risks will not 
survive. 
Probably entrepreneurs continually have various ideas about their firms milling around 
in their minds, but most ideas fade to the back of the mind or are rejected in an early 
stage. It is quite credible that entrepreneurs have even more alternative ideas than we 
think. Some entrepreneurs considered alternative ideas. We found that one idea will 
dominate and the entrepreneur will do everything in his power to realise this idea. In 
cases where the entrepreneur has no alternative ideas the one idea is so appealing that 
it is hard for the entrepreneur even to remember the alternatives. The idea is so attrac-
tive that he cannot get it out of his mind. Presumably the entrepreneur searches for 
reasons that will give the idea even more strength. Persons other than associates have 
no essential influence on this maturing process of the idea. 
 
The moment of the trigger and the informal decision 
At a certain point the idea has matured and has become very attractive to the entrepre-
neur. Even a trivial event could cause him to take action. Sometimes it is hard for the 
entrepreneur even to recall such an occasion. Without being noticed this occasion 
worked as an indirect trigger. If the idea is relatively immature and is still in the process 
of gaining strength a more powerful direct trigger is necessary before the entrepreneur 
will anticipate. This holds in particular for decisions where the idea and the trigger oc-
cur simultaneously. In such cases the entrepreneur will not even be considering the 
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and take action. We consider the moment of the trigger as the moment at which the 
entrepreneur makes his informal decision. Once this informal decision has been taken 
the entrepreneur is ready to elaborate his idea. 
 
Elaboration of the idea 
Once the entrepreneur has taken his informal decision he knows exactly what he aims 
to achieve with his idea but he does not know how to execute his idea. At this stage of 
the decision-making process the entrepreneur is definitely aware of what he is doing. 
The entrepreneur is usually very of patient and realises that a good timing is essential 
for success. For example a cost-benefit analysis helps the entrepreneur to determine 
whether the decision will lead to more sales and profit. 
It is in this stage of the decision-making process that the entrepreneur consults other 
persons such as lawyers, accountants and colleague entrepreneurs. The entrepreneur 
discusses everything with the associates, if there are any. Sometimes family members or 
other acquaintances are also consulted. If necessary the entrepreneur also consults 
banks about financial agreements. 
When elaborating the idea the entrepreneur considers alternative implementation pos-
sibilities and estimates the risk. Alternatives are judged on business motives and emo-
tions play a minor part. Economic rationality rules at this stage of the decision-making 
process. Entrepreneurs control their risks. An entrepreneur is willing to take some risks 
because he is convinced that the idea will be a success, but he always keeps track of 
these risks.  
Sometimes problems arise when elaborating the idea and the entrepreneur solves these 
problems with good grace. The reason for this is that the entrepreneur is still very con-
vinced that the idea will work out well. The entrepreneur will do everything in his 
power to make it a success. There are no doubts about the success of the idea, because 
otherwise the idea would have been rejected at an early stage and a no-go decision 
would have been made. 
 
Formal decision 
The elaboration of the idea approaches its end and it is time for the entrepreneur to 
round off. The entrepreneur feels that he is approaching a stage at which it is impossi-
ble to go back (point-of-no-return). At a certain moment the entrepreneur takes his 
formal decision, most often recorded as an agreement. When the entrepreneur consid-
ers a contract to be unnecessary the moment of the formulation is marked by the first 
step in the execution of the decision. 
 
Implementation of the decision 
After taking the formal decision the entrepreneurs implement their decisions. Although 
for some entrepreneurs this is a stage where there are no problems, other entrepre-
neurs may meet with resistance. The entrepreneurs state that such resistance is due to 
the implementation, but that the idea is still good. Most of the time such resistance re-
sults in a change in the implementation of the decision but rarely stops the implementa-
tion of the decision. Cessation occurs only when the idea loses its attraction, but these 
cases were not included in our sample. 
Most entrepreneurs say they are satisfied with their decision. Although sometimes the 
effect of the decision turned out to be different from what was expected, the entrepre-
neurs are still satisfied, because they would have regretted it if they had not even tried. 
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6  Confrontation with literature 
Most theories concerning the decision-making process (Mador, 2000; Mintzberg, 1976 
and Papadakis et al., 1998) gravitate around a model of decision-making, which com-
prises three components: the environment, the specific characteristics of the decision to 
be taken and the entrepreneur himself. These three independent variables are in con-
stant interaction while following the path of the decision process. The environment, 
process and event of entrepreneurial activities require a holistic analysis rather than a 
simplistic analysis of the individual elements of entrepreneurship (Bygrave, 1989). Pa-
padakis et al. (1998) state that for understanding decision-making process in depth, an 
integrative model, which includes decision specific, environmental and organisational 
factors, is needed. Likewise, De Meyer (1991) states that the elements that are expected 
to influence strategic processes are the manager's individual characteristics, internal or-
ganisational context, and environmental factors. In this chapter we look back to the lit-
erature on strategic decision-making and describe each of the three elements that in-
fluence the decision-making process. We confront our results found in the previous 
chapters with the existing literature on strategic decision-making. 
6.1 The  entrepreneur 
One of the major elements in the framework of the decision-making process is the en-
trepreneur. The process and antecedents of decision-making mainly take place in the 
entrepreneur's mind. Hence, it is important to study the psychological facets of the en-
trepreneurial personality in order to comprehend the strategic decision-making in SMEs 
(section 6.1.1). Besides the reflections on the entrepreneurial nature, entrepreneurship 
might be explained by examination of how entrepreneurs think, hence by their cogni-
tion (section 6.1.2). These cognitive mechanisms help us to analyse the entrepreneur's 
creative thinking process along the time frame of pre-idea through to the creation of 
the opportunity (section 6.1.3). 
6.1.1  Psychological traits of the entrepreneur 
According to Brouthers et al. (1998) the personal characteristics of the decision-maker 
influence the decisions taken, thus in small firms rationality is expected to be decreased 
due to the strong personal influence of the entrepreneur. Empirical studies found it 
hard to prove that entrepreneurs possess psychological or any other type of statistically 
significant differences than non-entrepreneurs (McClelland, 1967; Brockhaus, 1980; 
Schere 1982 and Low and MacMillan, 1988). Nevertheless, there are some widely 
spread beliefs about the entrepreneurial psychology which merit being mentioned here 
in order to get more insight in how entrepreneurs deal with strategic decisions. The 
most common psychological traits are discussed in this section. 
 
The need for achievement 
A significant psychological explanation of entrepreneurial acts is the need for achieve-
ment. For instance Shaver and Scott (1991) consider the achievement motivation. From 
this prospective the main characteristic of the business initiators is the high need for 
achievement which they define following McClelland (1967) as a preference for chal-
lenge, acceptance of personal responsibility for outcomes and innovativeness. Papadakis 
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for achievement and the attitude toward risk. Hornaday and Aboud (1971) found that 
compared to 'normal people' entrepreneurs have a higher need for achievement.  
 
Desire to be independent and individualism 
Hornaday and Aboud (1971) reported that in comparison with men in general, entre-
preneurs had a higher degree of independence desire. McGrath et al. (1992) found that 
entrepreneurs agreed, far more than did career professionals, that 'Success is owning 
your own company'. Further to the desire for independence, Sexton and Bowman 
(1985) state that entrepreneurs need autonomy and dominance and are not strongly 
absorbed by needs for support from others or conformity to the norms of others. Ac-
cording to McGrath et al. (1992) entrepreneurs are rugged individualists. Their research 
confirmed the idea that entrepreneurs favour independent action and separation from 
groups and clans. This finding is consistent with Hofstede's results (1980), in which high 
individualism is associated with emphasis on individual initiative and achievement.  
 
Locus of control 
The concept of locus of control refers to a generalized belief that a person can or can-
not control his or her own destiny (Rotter, 1966). People can be classified along a con-
tinuum from very internal to very external. Those who ascribe control of events to 
themselves are said to have an internal locus of control and are referred to as 'inter-
nals'. People who attribute control to outside forces are said to have an external locus 
of control and are termed as 'externals' (Spector, 1992, Nwachukwu, 1995 and Carver, 
1977). Gilad (1982) notes that almost three decades of research consistently shows that 
internals are alert, discover opportunities, and scrutinize their environment to find in-
formation needed to formulate the optimal approach to developing those opportuni-
ties. According to Rauch and Frese (2000) business owners have a slightly higher inter-
nal locus of control than other populations. 
 
Ability to focus and pursue a goal 
The empirical research of Levander and Raccuia (2001) observed that people possessing 
ADHD (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder i.e. hyperactivity) were highly over-
represented among the entrepreneurs. The results show that entrepreneurs differ cogni-
tively from the general population by a striking difference in the capacity to focus atten-
tion on a single task. Attention in this study is defined as the individual reception to en-
vironmental stimuli and the ability to process information. Thus, the survey concludes 
that it is the environmental stimuli and the ADHD that lead some individuals to react 
and to become entrepreneurs, motivating them for higher performance.  
 
Optimism 
Palich and Bagby (1995) suggest that entrepreneurs operate by a unique set of cogni-
tive processes, thereby supporting their optimism. Furthermore, literature on entrepre-
neurial behaviour suggests that entrepreneurs are likely to be optimistic and that they 
frequently make judgements based on subjective factors (Cooper et al., 1988; McCarthy 
et al., 1993 and Timmons, 1990). Excessive optimism involves acknowledging some 
risks and may lead to serious damage to the business and even to its complete failure.  
 
Other findings on entrepreneurial personality 
Besides the abovementioned psychological traits of the entrepreneur Lyon et al. (2000) 
consider that entrepreneurial behaviour can be described as aggressive, innovative, pro-
active, risk taking, and autonomy seeking. Stokes (1998) suggests that owner-managers 
tend to concentrate on the day-to-day at the expense of the longer term. Levander and   37 
Raccuia (2001) warn that typical entrepreneur's features such as impulsiveness, a low 
degree of flexibility and the inability to learn from mistakes as characteristics of entre-
preneurs may affect the process of strategic decision-making negatively. In addition to 
the above, Bazerman (1999) recognizes common behavioural traits and identifies ten 
'important money mistakes' when making decisions about money (or anything else). 
That is, entrepreneurs tend to be: 
−  Over-confident when making decisions, trusting in established routines when they 
ought to be more wary of the efficacy of those routines; 
−  Unprepared when making decisions, assuming decisions fully reflect their knowl-
edge and competence; 
−  Ignorant of others' decision-making and motives, assuming that others share the 
same dispositions and attitudes; 
−  Exclusive, assuming that their decisions are theirs alone, often failing to anticipate 
the interaction effects between themselves and others; 
−  Competitive, wanting to win while believing that their decisions will mean that oth-
ers' welfare will somehow suffer as a consequence; 
−  Focused on the short-term, thereby discounting the long-term in favour of immedi-
ate 'impulses'; 
−  Focused upon immediate reference points of value, ignoring the wider implications 
of any decision for their total well-being; 
−  Recursive in the sense that one decision is the prelude for another decision and so 
on (decisions escalate); 
−  Ignorant of the alternatives, while emphasizing what is immediately relevant and 
known from previous decisions; 
−  And easily influenced by 'big' events rather than the causal structure of economic 
and financial processes that produce those events. 
 
Psychological traits of the entrepreneur in practice 
In our case studies every entrepreneur showed the need to achieve for example: the en-
trepreneur of a supermarket wanted to buy a fifth supermarket because of the success 
of the other four, in addition to running a profitable camping site entrepreneurs are go-
ing to build a bungalow park, and others plan for integration of their offices in a joint-
venture. Although entrepreneurs sometimes consult other persons in their decision-
making process and they have many networks, they still want to take the decision 
themselves. If there are several associates then one entrepreneur takes the lead.  
We talked to entrepreneurs who were somehow less fortunate in the result of their de-
cision. The entrepreneurs blame themselves for the failure (internal locus of control). 
They also claim the praise for successes. We noticed that the entrepreneurs we inter-
viewed pursue a goal, but we do not whether this is because of ADHD. The entrepre-
neurs are very optimistic about the success of the decision. Even when there are some 
problems along the way they remain positive, because they are convinced that their 
idea will work out in the end. The psychological traits presented in literature correspond 
with our findings. 
6.1.2  Cognitive mechanisms 
Initially, research efforts were concentrated on identifying the personal traits, and those 
differences that led some people to recognise opportunities and to pursue them (Shaver 
and Scott, 1991). Most of these studies did not show viable support for the thesis that 
self-employed businesspeople are different from others. Thus, research shifted to an-
other possible source of explanation – cognitive predispositions, i.e. a hypothesis that 
entrepreneurs simply think in a different way (Baron, 1998). For example, Palich and 
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non-entrepreneurs, the entrepreneurs tend to categorise business situations as having 
more opportunities for potential profit. It is not that entrepreneurs do not recognise 
risk, they just do not estimate it to be as high as other people do, and neither are they 
afraid of it. Busenitz and Barney (1997) state that entrepreneurs are differ from manag-
ers in that they take decisions by relying much more extensively on biases and heuris-
tics, and furthermore speculate that without their use many entrepreneurial decisions 
would never have been made. Even if the use of cognitive biases may be beneficial in 
some circumstances, it may lead to major errors in others continue Busenitz and Barney 
(1997). The most dangerous aspect of decision-making is the tendency for even the 
smartest people to fall into the 'cognitive illusion' trap, which causes them to distort 
reality or delude themselves with sloppy or misguided thinking claims Bazerman (1999). 
Similarly, Baron (1998) argues that due to the specific situation entrepreneurs find 
themselves in (e.g. information overload, high degree of uncertainty, intense emotions, 
commitment, responsibility etc.) their susceptibility to cognitive biases and errors is in-
creased. Some contributions from literature concerning common entrepreneurial cogni-
tive biases are reviewed below. 
 
Emotional biases 
Most theories about strategic decision-making are silent about the role of emotions. 
However, Savage (1954) proposed anticipated regret as a determinant to influence de-
cisions, and later Bell (1982) systematically incorporated emotions into a theory of 
choice. Another interesting theory presenting further emotional biases in the entrepre-
neurial way of thinking is the affect infusion model, first developed by Forgas (1995). 
This model suggests that affective states created by one source or experience can influ-
ence (infuse) judgement about other unrelated events. Furthermore, Forgas speculates 
that the likelihood of affect infusion is higher when individuals engage in effortful 
thought (as entrepreneurs often are forced to do). Thus, Baron (1998) hypothesises that 
entrepreneurial decisions are highly susceptible to affect infusion.  
 
Self–efficacy  
Self-efficacy (Brockhaus, 1980; Bandura, 1986 or Chen et al., 1998) is the entrepre-
neur's belief that he can cope with anything. Self-efficacy beliefs help to determine how 
much effort entrepreneurs will spend on an activity, how long they will persevere when 
confronting obstacles, and how resilient they will be in the face of adverse situations 
(McCarthy et al., 1993). Moreover, McCarthy et al. differentiate it from self-esteem in 
that the latter is viewed as an inherent characteristic of individuals that is relatively sta-
ble across situations, whereas self-efficacy is situation specific. While being an impor-
tant prerequisite for entrepreneurial acts, self-efficacy represents a serious cognitive bias 
because it leads to the false perception of a very low possibility of failure (Brockhaus, 
1980). Such consequences of misjudgement are often observed in entrepreneurs (Koen 
et al., 2000) and are interlinked with further cognitive biases that represent a potential 
source of errors in the process of decision-making. It is plausible that entrepreneurship 
would be impossible without self-efficacy.  
 
Planning fallacy 
Planning fallacy is termed the tendency of most people to underestimate the time re-
quired to complete a certain project, or to overestimate how much they can accomplish 
in a given period of time (Baron, 1998). Due to the fact that entrepreneurs, by the very 
nature of their activity, constantly step into new experiences, they do not have ade-
quate reference (given the lack of previous experience) of how much personal effort or 
resources the activity will consume. Hence, they are likely, being optimistic and   39 
euphoric about the new activity, to think they are able to do more than they actually can 
(McCarthy et al., 1993). Indeed, belief in success is one of the key ingredients in a success-
ful business venture but at the same time unrealistic optimism leads to bad planning, which 
in most cases ends with losses and failure.  
 
Overconfidence 
The planning fallacy bias is closely related to the entrepreneur's belief that he or she is 
more likely to succeed than others in the same kind of business, i.e. to overconfidence. 
Overconfidence describes the tendency to overestimate the likely occurrence of a set of 
events (Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2001). Levander and Raccuia (2001) found that en-
trepreneurs have higher levels of self-confidence compared to general population. Thus, 
because of over-self-esteem, they are more susceptible to making decisions with uncal-
culated risks. It is not unusual for individuals to over- or underestimates their abilities 
and suffer the consequences of such errors of judgement.  
 
Attributional styles 
Baron (1998) claims that most individuals tend to attribute positive outcomes to internal 
causes (their own talent or effort) but negative outcomes to external causes (the self-
serving bias: blaming others for negative feedbacks of decisions). Especially the self-
serving bias i.e. the belief that negative outcomes are out of one's responsibility and 
attributed to external forces may be extremely devastating in strategic decision-making. 
Sooner or later it will probably lead to business failure. Baron (1998) predicts that suc-
cessful entrepreneurs are less susceptible to the self-serving bias than are unsuccessful 
ones.  
 
Escalation of commitment 
The phenomenon of over-commitment to a failing course of action, the consequence of 
psychological biases connected to the original choice, was introduced in literature by 
Staw (1977). Because of this 'escalation' bias, when meeting strategic decisions (like 
persisting with the marketing of a failing product or expanding instead of contracting 
the business assets) entrepreneurs, despite negative feedback, may continue devoting a 
significant amount of resources to activities that rationality would advise should be 
given up. Psychologically this misjudgement is explained by the fact that a negative out-
come of a decision provokes a self-justification process whereby decision-makers at-
tempt either to defend themselves against a perceived error in judgement or to make 
the previous choice appear rational by increasing their commitment to the failing course 
of action (Staw, 1981). Because of their deep commitment to their companies entre-
preneurs may be under considerable pressure to justify their initial decisions. It does not 
matter whether they are afraid of looking ridiculous in front of others or are unwilling 
to admit to themselves the initial mismanagement of resources, in both cases they con-
tinue to persist, claims Baron (1998).  
 
Improvisation 
Research within the strategic management domain suggests that improvisation is a 
commonly enacted activity during conditions of uncertainty (Mintzberg, 1994). Improvi-
sation is defined as the extemporaneous composition and execution of novel action 
(Moorman and Miner, 1999). Hmieleski and Corbett (2003) conclusions suggest that a 
proclivity for improvisation is an integral part of the entrepreneurial mindset. For exam-
ple, Baker et al. (2003) demonstrates that improvisation is often an elemental in the 
start-up of new firms.  
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Cognitive processes in practice 
We noticed that entrepreneurs rarely accept the idea without having a 'gut feeling' 
about it. The decision-making process is influenced by emotions, but it is hard for us to 
hypothesize whether emotions lead toward biases in the decision-making process. In 
each case study we find that self efficacy is present. The entrepreneurs do not have any 
doubts about their own capacity. This holds for more experienced entrepreneurs and 
entrepreneurs that are just starting-up a business. We recognise planning fallacy in a 
number of case studies. Entrepreneurs admitted during the in-depth interview that the 
decision-making process lasted longer then they expected. However, they remained patient 
and waited a little longer. On the other hand there were also entrepreneurs for whom the 
decision-making process proceeded much faster then expected. Overconfidence is not the 
right term to describe the confidence that the entrepreneurs have, because their confi-
dence did not lead to an overestimation of their abilities. In fact they are realistic. They are 
relativists and accept their personal weaknesses. The mechanism of attributional styles is 
perceptible. The entrepreneurs in the case studies claim the successes, but also give credits 
to other persons that helped them to attain this success. But we did not find that the en-
trepreneur avoids his responsibility if the decision turns out to be a failure. In a way the es-
calation bias is recognisable. One entrepreneur tried to save a subsidiary by giving it extra 
financial inputs, but the subsidiary eventually went bankrupt. In other case studies we did 
not recognise an escalation bias. We certainly found improvisation in our case studies. If 
something does not work out the way the entrepreneur wants it to, he improves to achieve 
his goal in the end.  
6.1.3  Creative ideas 
The cognitive processes that have been described in section 6.1.2 are not the vested 
interests of entrepreneurs alone. However entrepreneurs' internal thought processes, 
having the mental modelling ability to categorise, pattern match, make schemata, con-
cepts and apply them to problem solving and decision taking are of fundamental impor-
tance to the success of their business enterprise. According to Beattie (1999) it is also at 
the heart of the entrepreneurs' creative ability and also the processes that they employ 
to make their dreams come true. 
 
Creativity 
Kao (1989) says that creativity implies a vision of what is possible and the entrepreneur 
translates that creative vision into action. Creativity is about the quality of originality 
that leads to new ways of seeing and having novel ideas. It is basically a thinking proc-
ess associated with imagination, insight, invention, innovation, ingenuity, inspiration 
and illumination. Insight experiences in which creative ideas emerge unexpectedly from 
the subconscious in such a way that the creator is unable to explain how they got there 
(Henry, 1991). Creative ideas develop to a state where new ideas and challenges are 
welcome.  
Mooney (1963) considered four approaches to creativity (1) the creative person, (2) the 
creative environment, (3) the creative product and (4) the creative process. Perkins 
(1981) state that the more of the following psychological traits a person has the more 
creative he tends to be: strong commitment to the personal aesthetic, the ability to ex-
cel in recognising problems, mental mobility, to think in terms of opposites and contrar-
ies while seeking a new synthesis of ideas, a willingness to constantly take risks and 
stimulation by physical and/or mental thrills. Gryskiewicz (1987) considered the 'right' 
sort of environment for generating ideas to be freedom, encouragement, resources and 
time, recognition and challenge. The creative process is a mental modelling that takes 
place, mostly unconsciously, in preparing the mind to scan, recognise and categorise 
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Adoption or rejection of ideas in practice 
In a qualitative longitudinal research Beattie (1999) performed 50 in-depth interviews 
with Scottish entrepreneurs. One of the investigated aspects of his study was the adop-
tion or rejection of ideas. We briefly mention the main results of his study. There ap-
peared to be a never-ending search for new ideas and opportunities in order to stay 
ahead of the game. Each idea had its own path to follow. In many of the personal his-
tories the entrepreneurs picked up opportunities rather than ideas. They certainly did 
not relish discussing their ideas with anyone else until they themselves were convinced 
that it was worthy of further consideration and were, if necessary, able to defend their 
point of view. Most entrepreneurs realised that the right timing was the key to most of 
their decisions and actions and as a consequence, until the timing was right, ideas were 
placed on what they called a back burner. There was universal agreement that most of 
their inspirational ideas occurred outside their office environment. Once the entrepre-
neur has made his or her preliminary 'gut feel' decision about the idea, it is difficult to 
get a totally unbiased reaction from him or her about the idea in future deliberations. 
Entrepreneurs are too busy being positive and looking ahead to look back at negatives. 
One of the main reasons given for putting the idea on 'hold' is a lack of information to 
make a considered decision. The results Beattie presents are quite similar to our results 
concerning the way entrepreneurs are handle ideas. 
6.2  The entrepreneurial environment 
The study of entrepreneurship is deficient if it focuses exclusively on the characteristics 
and behaviours of individual entrepreneurs and treats the social, economic, and political 
infrastructure for entrepreneurship as externalities. A social system perspective that 
considers external environmental conditions is appropriate to explain the process of en-
trepreneurship (Van de Ven, 1992). Studies have explored the relationship between en-
vironmental conditions and new venture creation (Keeble and Walker, 1994; Reynolds 
and Williams, 1995), business survival (Romanelli, 1989; Stearns et al., 1995), business 
closure (Keeble and Walker, 1994; Westhead and Birley, 1994), the competitive strate-
gies pursued by organisations (Romanelli, 1989; Zahra, 1996) and business performance 
(Covin and Slevin, 1990; Vaessen and Keeble, 1995; Westhead and Wright, 1999). 
Entrepreneurs take decisions in an environment in which various actors and forces are 
present (such as: competitors, government regulations, customers with their specific 
demands, suppliers, tax authorities, investors etc.). Each of these plays a more or less a 
significant role in the performance of the firm by presenting opportunities and imposing 
threats on its activities (Kotler, 1988). Successful decision-making requires an accurate 
understanding of the environment in which that decision will be played out. Without 
that understanding, it is impossible to assess the probable consequences and choose 
thoughtfully among them (Messick and Bazerman, 1996). The decision environment is 
defined as the collection of information, alternatives, values, and preferences available 
at the time of the decision (Harris, 1998). To predict how decision-making is influenced 
by environmental developments, it is critical to understand how the individual cogni-
tively processes and interprets these developments. When regarding the environment, a 
central issue to analyse in the entrepreneurial behaviour is the ability to recognise op-
portunities (6.2.1), process information (6.2.2) and deal with risk propensity (6.2.3). 
6.2.1  Opportunity recognition  
In a rapidly changing world organisations need to continually identify new opportunities 
beyond existing competencies (Krueger, 2000). Opportunity recognition and informa-
tion search are often considered to be the first critical steps in the entrepreneurial proc-
ess (Christensen et al., 1994; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Opportunities are cre-42   
ated, or built, using ideas and entrepreneurial creativity (Dellabarca, 2002). McGrath 
(1999) argued that entrepreneurs have access to numerous shadow opportunities (i.e. 
opportunities that have not been recognised). Shane and Venkataraman (2000) state 
that 'why', 'when' and 'how' certain individuals exploit opportunities appears to be a 
function of the joint characteristics of the opportunity and the nature of the individual. 
Furthermore they highlight three main areas of difference between individuals that may 
help us understand why certain individuals recognize opportunities while others do not: 
knowledge (and information) differences, cognitive differences and behavioural differ-
ences. In the Schumpeterian perspective opportunities may be created inside the firm or 
by individuals outside the firm who operate independently (DeTienne et al., 2003). 
In addition Kirzner (1973) asserted that the entrepreneur identifies opportunities by be-
ing alert to and noticing opportunities that the market presents. The process of search 
and opportunity recognition can be influenced by the cognitive behaviour of the entre-
preneur. Chandler et al. (2002) suggest three categories when it comes to opportunity 
recognition processes: proactive search (Drucker, 1998), reactive search (Ardichvili et al., 
2003) and fortuitous discovery (Kirzner, 1979). Results indicate that initiatives discov-
ered through proactive search are implemented more rapidly than those discovered 
through reactive searches or fortuitously. As time passes the advantages in implementa-
tion speed are reduced and in some cases nullified. This implies that the opportunity 
recognition process has an impact on the timing speed of implementation, and may 
have longer-term impacts on profits. 
Low and MacMillan (1988) suggested that networks are an important aspect of the 
context and process of entrepreneurship. Networking allows entrepreneurs to enlarge 
their knowledge of opportunities, to gain access to critical resources and to deal with 
business obstacles (Floyd and Woolridge, 1999). Businesses owned by teams of partners 
generally have wider social and business networks (Cooper et al., 1994) and more di-
versified skill and competence bases to draw upon (Covin and Slevin, 1990). 
 
Opportunity recognition in practice 
Just as McGrath (1999) we are of the opinion that entrepreneurs have access to numer-
ous opportunities. The entrepreneurs do not recognise many of these opportunities. It 
was hard for us to detect whether knowledge differences, cognitive differences and be-
havioural differences had affected the recognition of the opportunity. The opportunities 
that come along are essential for the entrepreneur but we found that some entrepre-
neurs are looking harder for opportunities than others. We agree with Chandler (2002) 
that opportunities recognised by a proactive search were more rapidly implemented 
than the opportunities that were recognised by a reactive search or fortuitously discov-
ery.  
6.2.2  Information processing 
Information search behaviour can be bounded by the decision-maker's knowledge of 
how to process information as well as the ability to gather an appropriate amount of 
information (Woo and Lochovsky, 1992). Entrepreneurs with limited experience may use 
simplified decision models to guide their search, while the opposite may be the case 
with experienced entrepreneurs (Gaglio, 1997). Cooper et al. (1995) found that novice 
entrepreneurs sought more information than entrepreneurs with more entrepreneurial 
experience, but they searched less in unfamiliar surroundings. Further, entrepreneurs 
having high levels of confidence sought less information. Over time habitual entrepre-
neurs are likely to acquire information and contacts that provide them with a flow of 
information relating to opportunities.  
The ability of entrepreneurs to learn from previous business ownership experiences can 
influence the quantity and quality of information subsequently collected (Gaglio, 1997).   43 
In addition, it allows informed and experienced entrepreneurs to identify and take ad-
vantage of disequilibrium profit opportunities (Kaish and Gilad, 1991). This entrepre-
neurial learning process goes beyond acquiring new information by connecting and 
making inferences from various pieces of information that have not previously been 
connected. Some people habitually activate their mental schema for processing infor-
mation and can notice it in the midst of an otherwise overwhelming amount of stimuli 
(Gaglio, 1997). This may explain why the pursuit of one set of ideas and opportunities 
invariably leads entrepreneurs to additional innovative opportunities that had not previ-
ously been recognised (Ronstadt, 1988). 
 
Complexity of the information process 
An ideal decision environment would include all possible information, all of it accurate, 
and every possible alternative. However, both information and alternatives are con-
strained because the time and effort to gain information or identify alternatives are lim-
ited (Harris, 1998). Nowadays, entrepreneurs are faced with a rapidly changing and 
fast-paced competitive environment, which places demands on organisations to actively 
interpret opportunities and threats when making strategic decisions (Dess et al., 1997). 
At the same time today's rapidly changing markets offer little assurance that a decision 
will not soon prove to inappropriate or obsolete claims Dickson (1992). Probably the 
most important impact of modern environmental complexity on enterprises is the inten-
sification of information and communication processes. Information became the most 
sophisticated modern weapon to defeat competition. Some authors even call it a fourth 
production factor (Loasby, 1976). However, the immense new opportunities are only 
one side of the coin. The process could also represent a real threat for some enterprises.  
Nowadays, information flows are so intense and so diverse that for most companies it is 
hard to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant data. As much as the Internet helps 
businesses it could also be a dangerous source of disinformation. The phenomenon of 
immediatisation (pressure for multitasking performance) makes the problem even more 
complicated (Eisenhardt, 2000). Most entrepreneurs meet difficulties in selecting the 
correct information and taking a decision in the short term.  
As time passes, the decision environment continues to grow and expand. New data and 
new alternatives appear. Ideally, more information should enable the decision-makers 
to assess more precisely the probabilities or possible outcomes. However, Zacharakis 
and Meyer (1998) state that additional data even when relevant make the decision 
more complex. Even if more information is available, people usually do not analyse all of 
it, although they think they do (Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2001). Furthermore, the phe-
nomenon of information overload is also to be taken in consideration. People often 
have problems to select and process the needed data from the constantly intense envi-
ronmental flows (Loasby, 1998). Mental fatigue occurs, which results in slower or poor 
quality work. Often the outcome is fast, careless decisions or even decision paralysis - 
no decisions are made at all (Harris, 1998). Thus, according to Mador (2000) the proc-
ess of information gathering and analysis in SMEs is often chaotic and opportunistic. 
 
Information processing in practice 
Unconsciously entrepreneurs are always looking for information by surfing on the Inter-
net, reading a trade journal or talking to other entrepreneurs in the business. We no-
ticed that in decision-making the entrepreneurs searched for the most necessary infor-
mation to pursue their idea. Too much information will probably lead to delays or con-
fusion. The entrepreneurs formulated and created an image inside their head about the 
way they wanted to execute the strategic decision. Other persons do not have any in-
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available information. We received the impression that in all case studies it concerned a 
well-organised decision. Consequently, there was less need for information. 
 
Exploiting the opportunity and information 
The idea has been nourished and given a chance to develop. Once the opportunity has 
been identified and information relevant to the venture has been obtained, the next 
step for the entrepreneur (or the team of entrepreneurs) is to acquire new resources or 
effectively manage existing resources, in order to exploit the opportunity. Sometimes 
having an idea and seeing the opportunity in order to exploit the idea occurs almost 
simultaneously. However, in the majority of cases there is a 'time lag' between the two. 
6.2.3  Entrepreneurial risk propensity 
Since decisions must be made within this constrained environment and as it almost im-
possible to have all the information needed, the major challenge of decision-making is 
uncertainty, and a major goal of decision analysis is to reduce uncertainty (Harris, 
1998). In this context Knight (1921) claims that every effective exercise of judgement is 
coupled with a corresponding degree of uncertainty bearing, of taking the responsibility 
for the selected course of action. He differentiates risks as measurable whereas uncer-
tainty is immeasurable; hence there is no insurance for a business decision. Risks can be 
rated as percentages, ratios, rankings, grades or in any form that allows them to be 
compared (Harris, 1998). 
The risk-taking propensity is an individual's willingness to take or avoid risks in decision-
making (Jackson et al., 1972). Very few studies have shown statistically significant dif-
ferences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs in their risk-taking propensity 
(Brockhaus 1980; Low and MacMillan 1988). However, Palich and Bagby (1995) defend 
the idea that entrepreneurs do not differ from other people in respect to their risk pro-
pensity. Rather they react differently to environmental stimuli, especially when the data 
are equivocal. Entrepreneurs through the cognition process of categorisation are more 
capable of processing and storing ambiguous data, thus perceiving equivocal business 
scenarios more positively than others. Hence, it is not their risk propensity but their dif-
ferent cognitive processes that make entrepreneurs more optimistic about certain busi-
ness venture claim the researchers. Mullins and Forlani (2000) also studied the risks in-
carnated. According to them risk propensity appears to directly impact venture choice 
behaviour, rather than indirectly affecting behaviour through the perceptual process. 
Busenitz and Barney (1997) claim that using biases and heuristics as simplifying mecha-
nisms for dealing with problems concerning the turbulent and uncertain environment 
may be crucial. There are several theses about how the decision-makers cope with un-
certainty (hostile environment). In the first place environmental heterogeneity affects 
the strategic decision process characteristics such as rationality, and leads to greater use 
of cognitive simplification processes (Schwenk and Shrader, 1993). Hence, this hypothe-
sis claims that in order to deal with the external pressure and complexity, entrepreneurs 
seek to minimise their cognitive effort by creating 'short-cuts' in their thinking (such as 
relying on intuition or routine). Another element of the same hypothesis is suggested by 
Loasby (1998) who claims that it being quite expensive to collect information about all 
possible outcomes, decision-makers reduce their costs by postponing decisions and 
then simplifying the postponed decisions. Consequently, this results in various forms of 
errors. Secondly, hostile environments lead to a more rational decision process accord-
ing to Dess and Beard (1984). Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) also argue that it is 
positive to plan (comprehensiveness) in turbulent industries. A third idea is provided by 
Fredrickson and Iaquinto (1989), namely that it is positive to plan in stable, but it is 
harmful to plan in turbulent industries. Through several empirical studies the research-
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organisational performance in a stable environment and a negative relationship with 
performance in an unstable environment (as suggested by Frese et al., 2000). Dean and 
Scharfman (1996) also reported results showing that it is positive to plan in stable in-
dustries. Papadakis et al. (1998) found no convincing support for any of the theses in 
his survey.  
 
Risk propensity in practice 
The entrepreneurs in our case studies were more risk-averse then risk-loving. If the en-
trepreneur had to accept a small risk then this risk was not a threat for the continuity of 
the SME. When the entrepreneur had to accept greater risks then it was easy for him to 
single out these risks clearly. But above all the entrepreneur knew how to deal with 
these risks. 
6.3 The  strategic  decision process 
A strategic decision is a decision, which is 'important' in terms of the actions taken, the 
resources committed or the precedents set (Mintzberg et al., 1976). Eisenhardt and 
Zbaracki (1992) describe strategic decisions by saying: “those infrequent decisions made 
by the top leader of an organisation that critically affect organisational health and sur-
vival'. In section 6.3.1 we pay attention to content and process strategies. This helps us 
to better understand the strategic decision models we shall present in section 6.3.2. In 
the last section (6.3.3) we look whether the decision-making models described would 
apply to the entrepreneurial decision-making process. 
6.3.1  Strategy 
Before making his decision an entrepreneur works out his strategy. Chandler (1962) 
and Ansoff (1965) suggested making a distinction between the process of strategic 
management and the content of strategy. Frese and Rauch (2001) add another dimen-
sion: orientation. They state that all three strategy dimensions can, in principle, be 
crossed with another. 
 
Content strategy 
Content strategy is engaged in the nature of the strategic decision. The focus of con-
tent strategies is on generic strategies (Frese et al., 2000) that are concerned with the 
type of business decisions vis-à-vis the customers, suppliers, employees, products, pro-
duction factors, marketing, capital, competitors. Miles and Snow (1978) divide compa-
nies into four groups: prospectors, defenders, analysers and reactors. The prospector 
causes changes in the market. Contrary to the prospectors are the defenders who are 
playing a waiting game and desire stable markets. The reactor is a firm without any 
consistent strategy. Porter (1980) describes three competitive generic strategies. A cost-
leadership strategy means that a company produces at the lowest possible cost in the 
field. Firms using a differentiation strategy look for dimensions that are appreciated by 
customers. When firms are concentrating on one segment of the market and try to pre-
sent a distinctive strategy then Porter calls this a focus strategy. According to Frese and 
Rauch (2000) psychological issues are also important when it comes to content strategy, 
for example, how to convince banks to give credit or for developing a niche product. 
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Process strategy 
The strategic process emphasises the formulation and the implementation of strategy 
(Hanlon and Scott, 1993; Olson and Bokor, 1995). Frese et al. (2000) distinct planning 
strategy, opportunistic strategy and reactive strategy. A planning strategy implies that a 
top-down planning is used that is highly proactive. Opportunistic strategy implies very 
little planning but a higher degree of proactivity: one looks out for opportunities and 
takes them without any detailed planning beforehand. Finally, the reactive strategy im-




Orientation implies an attitude towards one's strategy: why a strategy is played out. 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996) conceptualised entrepreneurial orientation as consisting of 
five dimensions: innovation, proactiveness, risk-taking, autonomy, and competitive ag-
gressiveness. 
According to Mintzberg (1976) strategy is a series of decisions, and content theories do 
not take into account the complexity of the strategic decision-making process. We 
agree with Henry Mintzberg on this point. Entrepreneurs have to go through a process 
before they finally make their decision. Taking a decision is a process that consists of 
many phases and criteria (Hall and Hofer, 1993). The decision-making process is deter-
mined by the expectations of the decision-taker, calculating risk on one hand and the 
rewards on the other (Clark and Marshall, 2002). Harris (1998) states that the decision-
making process is a non-linear recursive process, because most decisions are taken by 
moving backwards and forwards between many criteria and alternatives. When we look 
at the decision-making models in the next paragraph we shall focus on the process of 
decision-making. 
6.3.2  Theoretical models on decision-making 
In this section five theoretical models of decision-making process are presented. Ra-
tional choice is incorporated in the 'elimination-by-aspects' (EBA) model, and the satis-
ficing model depicts the bounded rationality. Furthermore, the models of Mintzberg et 
al. from 1976 and 2001 represent a detailed framework on the stages in making a stra-
tegic decision. Last but not least we shall present Beattie's creation process model 
(1999). 
 
Tversky's 'elimination-by-aspects' model  
Tversky (1972) suggests a simplistic recursive EBA routine: 
Step 1:  Selection of a desired aspect (attribute). 
Step 2:  Elimination of all alternatives that do not have that attribute. 
Step 3:  Selection of another desired aspect and return to step 2. 
In doing so, the decision-maker goes closer and closer to the desired goal until its final 
achievement. 
 
Simon's satisficing model 
Simon (1976), suggests an even simpler strategy: satisficing. In some ways, this turns 
EBA on its head. The 'satisfactory' decision-making rule or heuristic is a two-step rule: 
Step 1:  Set the minimal acceptable level of each relevant attribute. 
Step 2:   Choose the first instance you come across that meets those minimal standards 
and then act accordingly.   47 
Clearly, EBA is a negative (eliminative) strategy while 'satisficing' is a positive (accep-
tance) strategy. Empirical work is required to reveal whether and under what circum-
stances these heuristics are actually used.  
 
Mintzberg's model of unstructured decision processes 
Indisputably, the most integrative and popular attempt to create a descriptive frame-
work of the decision-making process in literature belongs to Mintzberg et al. (1976). In 
their well-known study of twenty-five strategic decision processes across a range of or-
ganisations the scientists suggest that there is a basic structure underlying these 'un-
structured' procedures. The theorists define the characteristics of strategic decision 
process as novel, complex and open ended with decisions not so much made under un-
certainty, but within a continuous state of ambiguity, where almost nothing is given or 
easily determined. The proposed model tries to show that whilst strategic decisions are 
immensely complex and dynamic, it is possible to give them conceptual structuring. 
Mintzberg et al. (1976) argue that the structure can be described as being seven ele-
ments comprising three 'central phases' (identification, development and selection), 
three sets of 'supporting routines' (decision control, decision communication and politi-
cal) and six sets of 'dynamic factors' (interrupt, scheduling delays, timing delays and 
speedups, feedback delays, comprehension cycles and failure recycles). The general 
model describes the interrelationships among them and the decision processes studied 
are shown to fall into seven types of 'path configurations'. Three decision stimuli are in 
a continuum, namely 'opportunities' (voluntary decisions to improve a secure position) 
at one end, 'crises' (decision responses to intense pressures) at the other and 'problems' 
in the middle; each capable of integrating or moving along the continuum. The seven 
elements / stages of the decision-making process according to Mintzberg et al. (1976) 
are:  
1 Recognition 
This first stage marks the beginning of the decision-making process. Here, the need 
to make a decision becomes visible as a difference between certain actual situations 
and some expected standards or goals. Thus, the entrepreneur realises that a key 
moment has come and action has to be taken. Recognition depends on the way in-
formation is gathered and processed in the entrepreneurial mind and by the envi-
ronmental characteristics (encouraging or restrictive). 
2 Diagnosis 
In this stage, the entrepreneur seeks to comprehend the evoking stimuli and to de-
termine the cause-effect relationships for the decision-situation. Existing informa-
tion channels are reviewed and new ones found in order to clarify the issues and 
get as much input information into the decision-making process as possible. De-
termination of the scope and limitations of the decision is done.  
3 Search 
This stage is devoted to finding ready-made solutions i.e. to identifying the avail-
able alternatives. This is a hierarchical, stepwise process of alternative seeking. 
Cyert and March (1963) hypothesise that the search begins in immediately accessi-
ble areas, with familiar sources. Initial failure in search leads to use of more active 
search procedures and in more remote areas (Mintzberg et al., 1976). 
4 Design 
Here the decision-makers either modify available alternatives or create alternatives 
that do not yet exist. According to the approach used in this stage the final deci-
sions are classified as: ready-made (adopted from an existing alternative in the envi-
ronment); modified (when a ready-made solution is developed to fit the particular 
situation) or custom-made (when a solution is invented especially in order to meet 
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5 Screen 
Thus, the entrepreneurs disposes of a set of alternatives form the previous two 
stages. In the screen stage the decision-maker has to set criteria which the ideal de-
cision should meet and to eliminate the unfeasible solutions. 
6  Evaluation / choice 
In this stage the evaluation of the value of each alternative takes place first, then a 
course of action (a decision) is selected. The decision-maker considers the negative 
(cost, consequences, problems created, time needed, etc.) and the positive charac-
teristics of each alternative (money won, time saved, added creativity, or happiness 
to customers, etc.). A great number of factors have to be observed, most of them 
'soft' or non-quantitative. This is how elements of bounded rationality intervene the 
decision-making process. Being the most powerful and often the only decision-
maker, the entrepreneur often transfers his cognitive biases into the decision-
making process in this stage. The evaluation-choice routine is distorted by informa-
tion overload or by unintended as well as intended biases. 
7 Authorisation 
Decisions are authorised when the individual making the choice does not have the 
authority to commit the organisation to the selected course of action. The theorists 
introduce this routine in their model because it aims to create an integrative 
framework of the decision-making process. In the specific case of entrepreneurial 
decision-making, though, this stage does not represent significant research interest 
since entrepreneurs are autonomous. 
 
Summarising, Mintzberg et al's model (1976) suggests three main phases of the deci-
sion-making process. The recognition and the diagnosis routines form the central phase 
of identification. The search and the design routines structure the development central 
phase. Finally, the selection phase comprises the screen, the evaluation/choice and the 
authorisation routines. 
 
Mintzberg and Westley's 3-axis model  
It is disputable whether entrepreneurs follow to the letter the pattern that Mintzberg et 
al. (1976) propose. From the modern perspective Mintzberg revises his point of view to 
a certain extent (Mintzberg and Westley, 2001). Without denying the rational approach 
the researchers defend the thesis that the conventional rationality is no longer the only 
advisable way to determine the course of action. Good decisions are the output of care-
ful analytical thinking combined with two other possible 'ingredients' of decision-
making, namely intuition and pro-active behaviour. Consequently, they claim that there 
are three approaches to meet a strategic decision: 
 
8  Thinking first (rational) 
This is the already reviewed path to arrive to a decision:  
 
define → diagnose → design → decide. 
 
9  Seeing first (intuitive) 
  Seeing first' is a rather subconscious manner of decision-making, which requires a 
significant amount of prior experience. Here Mintzberg and Westley (2001) follow 
the Gestalt psychology developed by Wallas in the 1920s, which identifies four 
steps in creative discovery:  
 
preparation → incubation → illumination → verification. 
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10  Doing first (action-oriented) 
  If rationality is helpless and strategic vision is not available Mintzberg and Westley 
(2001) advise simply to 'jump into the pool', hence to undertake an action. The 
feedback of the action will direct the further steps. Thus, 'doing first' is a way to 
evaluate possible alternatives, to see which one suits the organisation best and to 
continue following it. This approach is advisable when the situation is novel and 
confusing, and things need to be worked out claim Mintzberg and Westley (2001). 
That is often the case when entering new industry. Here the pattern is suggested 
by Weick (1979):  
 
enactment → selection → retention. 
 
Mintzberg and Westley argue that an integrative and successful decision-making proc-
ess should rely on all the three axes. 
 
Process of creation 
The process of creation in its most simplistic terms, is the transformation of an idea into 
an opportunity and the opportunity into a creation. Although a number of stages are 
usually involved in the process of creation, there are times when some of the stages are 
short-circuited. Beattie (1999) distinguishes some phases in the creative process. This is 
modelled in figure 2. We will briefly describe each of the phases. 
figure 2  Process of creation 
 
 
 Source:  Beattie,  1999. 
Learning phase:  The entrepreneur's creative process requires skill, knowledge, 
experience and resources. In the beginning most of these 
originate from within the entrepreneur, and are fashioned 
from the experiences resulting from entrepreneur's life path 
and from the social, economical and environmental backcloth, 
which has surrounded the entrepreneur up to the time of 
making the decision to become entrepreneurial.  
 
Discovery phase:   Critically important is the necessity of cultivating a prepared 
state of mind, which then acts as the catalyst for the stimuli 
which impinges into the individual's thought processes and 
provides the beginning of the discovery phase of the creative 
process. Without having this antenna for alertness, recognition 
and receptiveness, ideas can fall on infertile ground and sub-
sequently wither. A prepared mind ensures that the seeds of 
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Crystallisation phase:   Although the process is a continuous one, the crystallisation 
phase can provide the entrepreneur with the necessary think-
ing space. Decision taking and problem solving can be put into 
incubation or on a back burner waiting for further inform of 
the answer to the problem or situation.  
 
Maturation phase:   When the “Ah Ha!” stage has been reached, mainly as a re-
sult of understanding and insight, the process can either be 
terminated, or given the all clear to go forward to the oppor-
tunity stage. This becomes the maturation phase of the proc-
ess, where flesh can be put on the bones of the idea in order 
to identify the how, the when, and the where, the creation 
will materialise and eventually gain acceptance by the market 
place in the implementation phase of the process. 
 
These creative stages and phases are not independent watertight compartments - they 
are completely dependent on each other. This indicates a multi-faceted and holistic as-
pect of the embryonic entrepreneur's path to the discovery, recognition and harnessing 
of the entrepreneurial idea and its evolution into an opportunity. 
6.3.3  Theoretical decision models in practice 
We end this section by looking at the practical use of the theoretical models discussed 
in section 6.3.2. Tversky's elimination-by-aspects model and Simon's satisficing do not 
apply to the decision-making process of Dutch entrepreneurs, because we think that 
these models do not cover all aspects of decision-making. As explained in the introduc-
tion we were first inspired by Mintzberg's model and we constructed our interview 
based on his model. However, we found that Mintzberg's model was not applicable to 
the entrepreneurs we interviewed about their decision-making process. In fact, our de-
scription of the decision-making process is quite different. The most important differ-
ence is that Mintzberg describes a complex process, which distinguishes several actors, 
which is probably very applicable to large firms, but the decision-making process of the 
entrepreneurs we interviewed was quite straightforward. By chance we talked to a 
manager of a large multinational family business and we gained the impression that the 
decision-making process was far from complex. The Beattie's model (1999) contains 
elements that we also found. The models show many similarities at a high level. 
6.4 Rationality 
Rational decision-making is choosing from alternatives in such a way that it coincides 
with the preferences and the conviction of the individual or group of individuals that 
make the decision. In this section we shall find out whether the entrepreneurs we inter-
viewed are rational in their decision-making. In economic literature three tendencies can 
be distinguished: classical rationality, bounded rationality and neoclassical rationality. 
 
Classical rationality 
Until the 70s the ruling paradigm was the one of homo economicus, the 'rational eco-
nomic man'. The classic theory of the rational choice suggests that people are driven in 
their economic actions by pure rationality, hence are able in any given situation to rank 
with almost mathematical precision their preferences and to pursue the optimal out-
come. Rational decision-making is choosing from alternatives in a way that complies 
'properly' with the preferences and beliefs of an individual decision-maker.   51 
Bounded rationality 
At the beginning of the 50s the fundaments of the rational theory began to crack. As 
the environment was uncertain and the market conditions far from perfect competition, 
the model of bounded rationality
1 emerged as an alternative to the classical rationality 
concept. Decision-makers generally are not looking for the best or optimal, but for a 
satisfying solution of a decision task (Simon, 1986). Thus, they may try to simplify a 
complex decision by anticipating only a small part of all possible outcomes. 
 
Neoclassical rationality 
The theory of 'bounded rationality' was studied and empirically tested by the followers 
of the neoclassical rational approach, who tried to overcome the gaps in the classical 
theory, in order to create a new rational model. Since the mid 70s, increasing interest 
has been taken in the analysis of quasi-rational decision-making under uncertainty and 
under risk. Several formal theories have been proposed such as the Tversky and Kahne-
man's (1986) prospect theory and the regret theory (Savage, 1954 and Bell, 1982). 
 
Rationality in practice 
The three above-mentioned theories on rationality are not explicitly applicable to the 
decision-making process of entrepreneurs. The decision-making behaviour we have 
seen in our case studies fits in the bounded rationality and neoclassical rationality better 
than those of classical rationality. We recognise that the interviewed entrepreneurs have 
to make their decisions under constraints. 
Although some entrepreneurs do consider alternative ideas, there is one idea that 
dominates them all. When the entrepreneur is elaborating the idea, there are far more 
options. Several possibilities are considered within the scope of the elaboration. Be-
cause both pilot studies were performed in retrospective this might lead to a bias to-
wards more rationality. Perhaps the entrepreneur is less rational than economic theory 
suggests. Busenitz and Barney (1997) state that entrepreneurs do not have all time in 
the world to reconsider all possibilities. Large firms are, in terms of sales and number of 
employees, far more rational than small firms (Brouthers et al., 1998).  
 
1
 Bounded rationality is rationality as exhibited by decision-makers of limited abilities (MIT encyclo-
paedia of Cognitive science, 2002).   53 
7 Future  research 
The case studies in the first and second pilot studies helped us to distinguish the stages 
and crucial moments in the decision-making process of entrepreneurs. Even though we 
have 22 case studies at our disposal it is hard to picture the impact of the important 
strategic decisions on the dynamics of the economy and the differences between sec-
tors. For that purpose we need quantitative data material. It might be useful to carry 
out a telephone survey among entrepreneurs to gather such quantitative information. 
 
This quantitative data would provide us with insight as to the percentage of SMEs that 
take important decisions and how many decisions they take during a certain period. We 
also wish to look for differences between sectors. Do entrepreneurs in a certain sector 
take more decisions than those in another sector? And perhaps the decision-making 
process differs across sectors. We want to distinguish eight sectors in our quantitative 
research: industry, construction, trade, hotel and catering industry, transport and com-
munication, financial services, business services and personal services. In addition we 
would also like to investigate the quantitative impact of entrepreneurial decisions on 
the Dutch economy by looking at the level of investment that was necessary to imple-
ment the decision. 
 
Although we have compiled an extensive chapter reviewing some literature on decision-
making, more attention for decision-making models in literature is necessary. We would 
like to provide an overview of the theoretical models and indicate whether they are 
empirically hypothesized and whether they are applicable to SMEs. An integral overview 
of the literature on decision-making is much needed.  55 
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Annex I  Case studies 
A1.1  Establishment of a joint venture by a small research 
agency and a communication agency 
A small research agency and a communication agency co-operate regularly. The com-
munication agency wants to pass on more and more research to the small research 
agency. It is hard for the research agency to handle the increasing demand. The com-
munication agency suggested to the entrepreneur of the research agency that he 
should expand. But the emphatic wish of the entrepreneur is not to expand because the 
entrepreneur had already had some bad experience in managing personnel. The entre-
preneurs of the research agency and the communication agency decided to establish a 
new joint venture in the communication agency's building. 
The idea of establishing this joint venture existed for some time. The trigger that led to 
activating the idea was the arrival of a female applicant. This applicant wanted a job at 
the communication agency, but she seemed very suitable for a management function in 
the new joint venture. The confidential relationship between the two agencies and a 
large initial assignment made it possible to start the joint venture. At the moment the 
new agency is even larger than the research agency although it still strongly dependent 
on both founders. In the long run the director of the joint venture will take over in-
creasing responsibility. 
A1.2  Buying a fourth supermarket 
The owner of four supermarkets wanted to prevent a supermarket in the same area 
from falling into the hands of a competitor. Therefore the entrepreneur decided to buy 
the supermarket that was for sale. It was not an easy decision. The supermarket in-
cluded an unhygienic and unprofitable bakery. Nevertheless the entrepreneur found the 
courage to buy the supermarket because customers stressed that the entrepreneur 
could make something good out of it. This was the trigger that motivated the entrepre-
neur to take over the supermarket.  
The reorganisation of the bakery cost a lot of money. Only after a few years was a 
break-even situation was achieved. At the moment the supermarket is making some 
profit but this is still not the case for a badly situated supermarket he bought a few 
years earlier. The entrepreneur is now considering another take-over, he is constantly 
on the look out for new opportunities, but his wife tells him that he should think things 
over at his age. He is not sure if he agrees. 
A1.3  Establishment of a joint venture by a civil engineering 
agency and a large foreign agency 
Traditionally the civil engineering agency is engaged in the construction of large and 
prestigious buildings. For a long time the youngest director/stake holder of this civil en-
gineering agency has had the feeling that the agency should do something about diver-
sification to acquire enough assignments in the future. 
At a certain moment the agency had the opportunity to diversify by accepting the offer 
from a large civil engineering agency of being taken over. At first the two other direc-
tors, who were much older than the entrepreneur we spoke to, liked this idea. They 
would receive a large sum of money and retire without any financial worries. Normally 64   
directors who leave the agency receive no goodwill payment at all. The youngest was 
not willing to accept this offer and brought forward various arguments to support his 
refusal. The SME has belonged in the top of the market segment for quite some years 
now and has always worked independently. The entrepreneur also felt responsible for 
his employees. A tradition of pride has dominated the SME for many years. The two 
older directors, who were not far from retirement, agreed to the youngest director's 
proposition to retain their independence. 
What happened here worked as a trigger to formulate an alternative plan. Together 
with a large foreign civil engineering agency they started-up a joint venture which 
would be capable of entering the railroad infrastructure market. At the moment the en-
trepreneur is not very satisfied with this joint venture. The in-put of the large foreign 
agency is minimal and the number of assignments remains low. In the meanwhile the 
entrepreneur is looking for other opportunities. 
A1.4  Drastic upgrading of a menu at a pub serving food 
The owner of a pub serving food noticed that the dishes on his menu did not differ 
from other pubs serving food and he wanted to be more distinctive. The entrepreneur is 
member of the committee of a local union of entrepreneurs in the catering industry 
through which he has a good overview of the market. His associate immediately agreed 
to the new plan. 
The menu was changed to offer food comparable to that of a haute cuisine restaurant. 
The entrepreneur had some knowledge of haute cuisine gained in a former restaurant 
that he owned. The prices were raised, but kept below those of a haute cuisine restau-
rant. The pub chef was able to cope with the haute cuisine menu. The entrepreneur 
wanted to attract new customers such as two income families but he was not sure 
whether he would succeed. 
The upgrading of the menu was almost immediately a success despite of the fact that 
there was no advertising. According to the owner of the pub word of mouth advertising 
works best. In the meanwhile the formula has been successful for quite some time and 
this success is still continuing. The turnover and profit have improved and this in con-
trast to the competitors for whom this formula did not work. 
A1.5  The opening of an branch establishment in Belgium by a 
Dutch subsidiary company of an international transport 
business 
The manager of a Dutch subsidiary company of an international transport business re-
ceived a phone call from the business owner in Germany. The owner instructed the 
manager to look for a new location for an extra branch of the transport business in Bel-
gium and to run this extra establishment. The idea arose from a situation in which there 
had been various problems dealing with allowances and visas when drivers changed in 
certain countries. Formerly these exchanges took place in car parks. The manager of the 
Dutch subsidiary company had been toying with the idea for a while. The instructions 
given by the international business owner worked as a trigger for him to go into action. 
We do not know what the direct cause was for the owner to make this phone call. 
It so happened that a good location was found very quickly in the area that the man-
ager had in mind. The decision to buy the land and make some large investments was 
communicated by telephone by the international owner. The manager is well known 
and trusted by the international business owner. The opening of an extra establishment   65 
turned out to be a satisfactory decision. This decision was not high-risk, because it 
mainly concerned mainly an investment in real estate, which will retain its value. 
The manager of the subsidiary transport business also spoke about another important 
strategic decision that took place a couple of years ago: the take-over of a medium-
sized Dutch transport business. We consider this decision as a separate case study in 
further analysis. A short description of this decision is given in the next section. 
A1.6  The take-over of a medium-sized transport business 
The take-over of a Dutch medium-sized transport business by the previously mentioned 
international transport business also took place after a telephone call from the interna-
tional business owner. This international business owner contacted the manager of a 
shipping agency in the Netherlands. The international business owner instructed the 
manager to look for a Dutch transport business that would be suitable for a take-over 
and eventually to manage this firm. The idea for this take-over had existed for a while 
because as yet the international transport business had no branch in the Netherlands. 
At first the manager of the Dutch shipping agency had some doubts about the idea but 
now he is very enthusiastic about it. 
After a search operation directed by the manager of the shipping agency a suitable 
candidate was soon found. At that time he was very familiar with the transport market 
in his vicinity as in his position he had regular contacts with shipping agents. A destitute 
transport business attracted his attention. 
The international business owner had complete confidence in the manager's choice. 
The manager insisted on a visit by the international business manager to at least take a 
look at what he was going to buy, but the international business manager rejected this 
idea and bought the company unseen. After the take-over the company was completely 
modernised, new equipment was purchased and the office was renovated and ex-
tended. Once this had been completed the international business owner came to visit, 
for the first time, the company he had bought. He was very pleased with what he saw 
and both he and the manager are satisfied with the way the Dutch transport branch is 
progressing. 
A1.7  Large investment in new equipment and software by a 
sound engineer 
A freelancer, whose profession is that of a sound engineer, decided to do some editing 
in addition to his work of making sound recordings. He has some affinity with editing 
films and documentaries, for example, because he trained at the film academy. The 
sound engineer had had the idea of doing some editing at the back of his mind for 
some time. 
When his wife came home with a film that needed to be edited (trigger) the idea 
gained strength. The sound engineer decided to buy some editing equipment : a com-
puter and software. The sound engineer knew there was new software available in the 
United States, but it took a while for this software to become available in Europe. As 
soon as the software was introduced onto the European market the sound engineer 
bought it. Taking into account his annual earnings this represented a large investment 
for him.  
The return on investment has already been achieved. Temporarily the sound engineer 
has decided to do no more editing, because it is too time consuming and not much is 
tax deductible. The large investment was not something that caused him to have sleep-
less nights because he knew that he could earn back his investment by editing in the 66   
evenings. The van which he recently bought to transport all his equipment is an invest-
ment that worries him a lot more. 
A1.8  Management buy-out at a SME that cleans and renovates 
the fronts of houses 
The entrepreneur of a medium-sized firm that cleans and renovates the fronts of houses 
realised that arranging for a successor had to start in time. The entrepreneur had seen 
that another firm had had problems in finding the right successor in time and that the 
business owner was still involved to some extent in running the firm in spite of his age. 
That firm they had had to find a potential buyer at very short notice and the knowledge 
of this fact acted as a trigger for the entrepreneur to concentrate on arranging his own 
succession at an early stage. 
The entrepreneur looked inside his SME and found two employees that he considered 
to be suitable for a possible management buy-out. One of the candidates was his 
younger brother. A couple of years ago (after some discussions and the assistance of 
the accountant) they signed an agreement in which the three of them agreed upon a 
gradual management buy-out. The culminating point would be the transfer of stock 
and the resignation of the managing director who would, however, remain available for 
a couple of days a week. In addition to his work for the SME, that cleans and renovates 
the fronts of houses, he wants to put some of his own patents on the market.  
It is remarkable that in this case study, just as in the case study of the civil engineering 
agency, the entrepreneur took the decision in the interest of the identity of the firm. 
A1.9  Large investment in a modern silk-screen printing machine 
at a printing office 
Before the current entrepreneurs of the printing office took over the firm they were 
planning to make a considerable investment in a modern silk-screen printing machine. 
The enterprise focuses on a high-grade segment in the market in which there are only a 
few competitors. The new machine is capable of making high quality silk-screen prints 
for artists. Using the old machine this required many man-hours and a long passage 
time but a short passage time is required for the silk-screen prints for chain store busi-
nesses that want their posters printed within one or two weeks. The entrepreneurs 
wanted to keep their share in this prestigious market. After taking over the firm the two 
entrepreneurs made all the necessary preparations for such a substantial investment. 
The actual moment of the take-over was the trigger to go through with the idea of buy-
ing a new silk-screen printing machine. 
Although the bank was not very keen on the idea of helping the entrepreneurs to fi-
nance the machine it did agree, thanks mainly to the efforts of the accountant. The 
supplier also helped by making use of existing peripheral equipment after overhauling 
it. The new machine can generate extra sales and even if no extra sales are generated it 
is still possible to maintain the current level of profit because some of the depreciation 
costs have been written off. This was the most important argument to convince the 
bank to finance the investment. The depreciation of the new silk-screen printing ma-
chine will have been completed within five years and the machine can be used for sev-
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A1.10  Start-up of a subsidiary business by a telephone and data 
cable installation firm 
At the time of the boom on the telecommunication market an installation firm for tele-
phone and data cables decided to start-up a subsidiary that would work only for SMEs. 
Up to now, however, they have worked only directly or as a subcontractor for large en-
terprises. The entrepreneur wanted to capture the market for the installation of tele-
phone and data cables for SMES. To avoid conflicts with largest telecommunication 
provider in the Netherlands, which is a very important customer, they had to start up a 
subsidiary. 
The employees indicated that they would also like to do some other work. The entre-
preneur did not want to lose his people and this was the trigger for him to elaborate his 
idea. The entrepreneur found two associates who were enthusiastic about the devel-
opments. Not only did they own a large amount of shares of the subsidiary, but they 
were also prepared to work for this subsidiary. 
There was not one bank that was willing to finance the subsidiary and for this reason 
they searched for an investor. However, the telecommunication market collapsed dra-
matically in 2001 and the investor would have lost more money to keep the firm in 
business so he dropped out. The parent company had to bear all the costs. This threat-
ened the continuity of the installation firm and in 2002 the entrepreneur applied for 
bankruptcy for the subsidiary. The consequence is that the parent company has to de-
pend more on the bank and his own interest is reduced almost to zero.  
A little while ago the firm won a large, long-term project and the market is starting to 
improve somewhat so that the entrepreneur is hopeful about the position of the instal-
lation firm. In the meantime the installation firm has been working on projects that 
were won by the subsidiary. From now on the parent company is attempting to expand 
the activities on the market for SMEs. This has been made possible because the rela-
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Annex II  Case studies 
A2.1  The start-up of a machine-shop  
The entrepreneur had worked for many years as an employee of a company manufac-
turing of agricultural machinery. The market for agricultural machinery was starting to 
collapse so the need for components for these machines was diminishing. As a conse-
quence the firm had to close the machine-shop and the entrepreneur's job was at 
stake. At his age, and bearing in mind the unfavourable economic situation, it would be 
hard to find another job. The entrepreneur had a lot of knowledge of and experience in 
machining components for agriculture machinery and he did not want to waste his 
skills. He was really eager to do something with his knowledge and therefore hit upon 
the idea of starting-up his own machine-shop.  
Before the entrepreneur could actually start-up his own machine-shop he needed to 
find a business associate who could operate the machinery. The entrepreneur ap-
proached another employee working for the same company whose job was also on the 
line. They agreed to go into business together. After making a cost-benefit analysis and 
discussing his plans with the management team of the manufacturing company the en-
trepreneur then definitely decided to start-up his own business. The entrepreneurs 
could rent their own working space from the manufacturing firm. There was no way 
back when the management team of the manufacturing company gave the entrepre-
neur a rental agreement, which he had to sign.  
There were some problems when deciding about the legal form and obtaining the fi-
nancing required but, eventually all the problems were solved and the start-up of the 
machine-shop was a fact. At the beginning the entrepreneurs found it hard to run their 
own business. Now that the firm is making progress entrepreneurship has becomes 
more enjoyable. The entrepreneur is still content with his decision, but he admits that 
he would not take the same step again. 
A2.2  The buy-out of an associate in a multimedia firm 
Together with his business associate the entrepreneur decided to continue their multi-
media firm with two associates instead of three. However, numerous factors resulted in 
an intolerable situation. The two associates noticed that the third associate wanted to 
be the manager of the firm instead of one of a team. The third associate went on a 
holiday during a very busy and stressful period even though the other two associates 
needed his help, but he waved away their arguments asking him to stay and help them. 
The multimedia firm was still a hobby for the third associate not a serious profession 
whereas for the other two entrepreneurs it was their profession. The entrepreneur and 
the third associate lived together in one house and this meant that discussions about 
work continued at home. Eventually there were too many irritations and the bomb 
burst.  
That happened at the beginning of a new year. Each of the three associates had to 
write down his vision of the future of the firm but the third associate was unable to do 
so, even after being given several chances. The other two entrepreneurs interpreted this 
as a lack of commitment and discussed their feelings with the third associate. It was 
hard for the two entrepreneurs, but they finally presented an ultimatum: “Either you 
leave or we do”. Because the three entrepreneurs were friends it was very hard to issue 
this ultimatum.  70   
The third associate took the honourable way out and left the multimedia firm. The two 
entrepreneurs that remained had to buy him out. The multimedia firm's accountant 
took care of this financial procedure and found a solution that was satisfactory for eve-
ryone. The break-up was hard for the entrepreneur we interviewed because he shared a 
house with the third associate and there was a lot of tension at home too. The situation 
became untenable and the entrepreneur had to leave his house within a week but find-
ing a new house was hard in such a short time. The entrepreneur talked a lot to his 
family during this period of time, because they understood the problems of having their 
own firm. Ultimately the entrepreneurs of the multimedia firm are pleased that they 
took this decision because things are running much more smoothly at work and com-
munication has improved 100%. 
A2.3  The removal of an insurance agency 
The entrepreneur wants to move to another office: a historic farm that was going to be 
demolished. This farm is situated a few hundred metres away from his present office. A 
friend working for the local authorities told the entrepreneur and his wife that this his-
toric building was for sale. Horses are the entrepreneur's hobby and for years he has 
wanted to keep his own horses, buying the farm would make this possible. 
He visited the farm together with his wife who is a real estate agent and thought the 
place would be ideal for their purpose. But local planning authorities had designated 
the area for business purposes. As the entrepreneur and his wife were very confident 
that these plans would change in the near future they rang the local authority and 
made a bid for this farm. There were other bidders but most of them dropped out 
when they heard about the development plan. Now, however, the plan has changed 
and the land has been released for residential buildings. 
The entrepreneur still is not the owner of the farm, because the appeal court turned 
down the development plan. There are some problems with the expansion of the area 
and a pig farm on the other side of the road. The entrepreneur hopes that everything 
will be settled next year. He has already contacted an architect specialised in the reno-
vation of historic buildings as he intends to restore the farm. 
A2.4  A snack bar owner decides not to buy a computer-
controlled cash desk system  
At a catering exhibition the entrepreneurs (husband and wife) of a snack bar saw a 
demonstration of a computer-controlled cash desk system. The entrepreneurs were very 
enthusiastic about this system. Which could make it so much easier and faster to add 
up the bill, especially on Sundays when it is very crowded in the snack bar. They invited 
some companies to tender and two salesmen demonstrated the computer-controlled 
cash desk system in their own snack bar. 
The female entrepreneur has only just learned to work with personal computers. She 
experiences difficulties in working with a personal computer and she is afraid that it 
would not be easy for her to work with the computer-controlled cash desk system and 
it would be even harder to explain it to her employees. For this reason they decided not 
to buy the electronic cash desk system. Perhaps in a few years time they may buy a 
computer-controlled cash desk system for the snack bar, but this will happen only when 
the female entrepreneur is more familiar with the world of computers.  
Instead of the computer-controlled cash desk system the entrepreneurs bought a new 
oven for baking French fries. This was done on impulse. Nevertheless, the entrepreneur 
is very pleased with the new oven. The quality of the French fries is much better and the   71 
fries not so greasy. There is also more space to pack the French fries. To date the fe-
male entrepreneur does not regret the decision not to buying the computer-controlled 
cash desk system, because the new oven has more advantages than the computer-
controlled cash desk system would have had. 
A2.5  The replacement of a water supply system on a camping 
site 
About nine years ago the owners of the camping site had to replace their electricity 
network because the fuses kept blowing. The female entrepreneur's husband discov-
ered that the water meter kept running even though no water was being used. A short 
time later he realised that there had to be a leak in the water supply system and further 
investigation showed that there was a leak in the main pipe. There was only one op-
tion: to replace the existing water supply system. 
Some specialists visited the camping site and inspected the water supply system. Even-
tually, two companies were invited to tender. The replacement of the water supply sys-
tem involved a substantial investment. At a meeting of the three associates (female en-
trepreneur, her husband and her mother) it was decided to choose the firm with the 
best (and most economic) tender. It was a race against time to get the installation of 
the new water supply system finished. Bad weather was the cause of some delay but 
the installation was finished just a couple of days before the opening of the new camp-
ing season. The entrepreneurs are still content with the new water supply system. 
A2.6  Building a new bungalow park 
The owners of the camping site in paragraph A2.5 also want to build a new bungalow 
park. A long time ago the female entrepreneur's father bought a piece of land but this 
land has never been used. Approximately eight years ago the idea of building a new 
bungalow park was born. The economic situation was favourable and bungalow parks 
were shooting up like mushrooms. A developer visited the owners of the camping site 
and interested them in building a bungalow park. After this visit the entrepreneurs real-
ised that they ought to use the piece of land to build a new bungalow park. Previously 
they were thinking about expanding the camping site but the local authorities were 
against any further expansion but they did like the idea of a new bungalow park, al-
though the entrepreneurs had to meet certain demands. 
The entrepreneurs spoke to a total of three or four developers and after listening to 
their plans they visited some bungalow parks. Finally they chose the most appropriate 
developer. This developer, however, wanted to sell all the bungalows, but the entrepre-
neurs did not agree and the plan did not go through. The another new developer was 
called in but he went bankrupt and the construction of the bungalow park had to be 
postponed again. After such disappointing experience with developers the entrepre-
neurs decided to hire a building contractor themselves. The construction of the bunga-
low park will start soon. Previous difficulties with this project have made the female en-
trepreneur rather nervous about whether construction will really start this time. 
A2.7  Start-up of a new glass distribution firm 
The entrepreneur and his brother run a firm in specialised glazing. They have built up a 
good reputation in their own region and sector. And this is why a well-known interna-
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question if he wanted to be one of the team partners. The entrepreneur saw this as a 
real compliment and he was enthusiastic and swiftly agreed. Becoming a partner meant 
that the old company name could no longer be used. The entrepreneurs changed the 
name of their firm  
Besides changing the name the entrepreneur also recognised the opportunity offered 
for selling glass. There are several reasons for selling special glass. Despite the bad eco-
nomic situation the entrepreneur still wants the firm to grow. The entrepreneur likes to 
talk and in his present work he cannot express himself enough, selling special will give 
him opportunities to talk to other people. The entrepreneur does not always want to 
work as a subcontractor, he would rather pull the strings himself. The entrepreneur's 
brother was sceptical at first, but after a while he became enthusiastic as well. 
The entrepreneur realised that some organisational changes had to be made. He 
wanted a strict distinction between selling glass and the special glazing firms. The rea-
son for separating the activities and having two firms is to spread the risks. The old of-
fice was no longer suitable for the new venture so they looked for another office and 
eventually they leased the building previously occupied by their international partner. 
The entrepreneur admits that it is very exciting to start a new business in selling special 
glass, because the market conditions are still bad.  
A2.8  Succession of an entrepreneur at a dental lab 
The entrepreneur is nearing retirement age and wants to stop working in the dental 
lab. He realises that he will have to stop one day and it is better to think everything 
through carefully rather than have to find a successor at short notice. That is why he is 
looking for a capable successor a few years before his retirement. Once he has found a 
successor he wants to slow down and work less. His succession is part of the strategy 
that the entrepreneur has clearly defined for the next couple of years. 
The dental technician first looked among the lab staff to see if there was a possible suc-
cessor. The person he had in mind had once been declared bankrupt and did not want 
to experience such a thing ever again. Another person wants to take over the dental 
lab, but the entrepreneur thinks this person is not capable of running the lab. The only 
option is to find an external successor. Two candidates have announced that they are 
interested. Before he makes his decision the entrepreneur wants to talk to them per-
sonally and assess what their ideas are. If the ideas are similar to his own and the feel-
ing is right then he will choose the best successor. The day after our interview the en-
trepreneur had a first meeting with one of the candidates. 
A2.9  Introduction of a data warehouse at an information centre 
A national supplier of information to health insurers has decided to introduce a data 
warehouse. The health insurers needed more and more information about the pharma-
ceutical behaviour of their clients. Because there was no central data source there were 
lot of delays and mistakes. It was necessary to organise the data to be able to meet the 
customers' demand for information. Other firms had found a data warehouse to be 
successful and this would be the solution to this firm's problem. 
The entrepreneur acknowledged that a data warehouse should be built with the help of 
an external software design agency. A software design agency with which he was famil-
iar was approached and was asked to think about the size of the investment. The 
amount of the investment mentioned by the well-known software design agency was 
too high according to the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur found it difficult, but asked 
another software design agency for a second opinion. This agency provided a lower es-  73 
timate of the costs. In the end the first agency was chosen, because money was not the 
only motive and this agency knows much more about the internal organisation of the 
supplier of information to health insurers. 
The introduction of a data warehouse is a growth process. At a certain moment the 
process is making progress and it would be a great shame to stop. The data warehouse 
is beginning to look more and more like the system that the entrepreneur had in mind. 
In the near future more data warehouses are going to be built and where possible the 
databases will be linked. But it is quite possible that a different software design agency 
will be asked to build these data warehouses. The entrepreneur is not satisfied about 
the performance of the present agency. 
A2.10  Sell more confectionery instead of running a lunchroom 
The entrepreneur, a confectioner, decided to close his rather unsuccessful lunchroom 
and instead he wanted to sell a broader range of confectionery. A salesman from a 
well-known firm that makes confectionery asked the entrepreneur to sell their goods. 
Right from the start the confectioner found this idea very attractive. The confectioner 
saw this as an opportunity to get rid of his unsuccessful lunchroom and instead sell 
more confectionery which enjoys a certain reputation, is of high quality and above all 
tastes good. Before deciding to sell the confectionery, the entrepreneur considered an-
other idea: selling hand-made chocolates. This idea was less attractive, because the con-
fectioner had to learn a completely new skill and it would cost him too much effort. He 
argued that confectionery could be sold anywhere. 
The salesman mentioned sales figures that sounded too good to be true. The entrepre-
neur wanted to judge for himself if the sales figures were feasible. He visited some 
other confectioneries that sold confectionery of the same brand. All these confectioner-
ies are successful and this convinced the entrepreneur to sell confectionery. To realise 
his decision the pastry cook had to buy a new display case and a new refrigerator. 
A2.11  No fourth associate at an insurance office 
Three associates own the insurance office. We spoke to one of the associates and he 
told us that an acquaintance of his called him at the office. This person (a male) had a 
large portfolio of insurance files, which he wanted the insurance company to manage. 
The acquaintance mentioned some percentages that, according to the entrepreneur, 
were not feasible. However, a new large portfolio sounded good to him so the entre-
preneur invited the acquaintance to meet him to discuss the percentages. After some 
discussion the entrepreneur suggested starting-up a new partnership in which they 
could manage the new portfolio. Half of the stock was to be controlled by the insur-
ance office and the other half by the potential fourth associate. As the potential associ-
ate disagreed another solution was found. The potential fourth associate would work 
for insurance office as an employee for a few months to see how things would work 
out. 
At first glance the idea seemed very attractive, because the potential fourth associate 
would bring along more customers. A few days after the potential associate started 
work the entrepreneur felt rather uneasy and after two weeks he was having second 
thoughts about the whole situation. He talked about his feelings with the other two 
associates. They were still quite happy about the potential associate because he would 
bring along more customers. The fact that his fellow associates had no worries left the 
entrepreneur feeling very insecure. He was very relieved to hear, after about two 
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potential associate and decided that is was the best for all of them if he went his own 
way. The insurance office took a no-go decision when giving up the plan of having a 
fourth associate.  
In retrospective the potential fourth associate did not have any knowledge of insurance. 
The associates are very pleased with their no-go decision although there were some fi-
nancial problems when the ex-potential associate left. If they find a good candidate 
who wants to join them he or she is will be welcome. However, the entrepreneurs will 
be more careful in future. 
A2.12  Co-operation between an insurance office and a real es-
tate agent 
The insurance office mediates mortgages. If the insurance company's customers want 
to buy a house the office often refers them to an estate agency. One of the employees 
at the estate agency would like to start his own agency. If he is to achieve his dream he 
needs to co-operate with the insurance office and he therefore contacted the entrepre-
neur about possible co-operation. The entrepreneur, in turn, is aware that he could also 
make some money out of selling houses.  
The idea is still in a premature stadium. Up to now there have only been a few conver-
sations between the real estate agent and the associates of the insurance office. No 
specific action has been taken. It will some time before there are any concrete proposals 
to elaborate the idea.  
A2.13 Co-operation  between  two insurance offices 
About thirteen years ago the entrepreneur started his own insurance office. The office 
was situated immediately behind the entrepreneur's private house. Although the entre-
preneur has one assistant as an employee there were many times at which no one was 
accessible (by phone) at the office. It was more than difficult to reach the office espe-
cially during the holidays, illness and days off. The entrepreneur searched for a solution 
to his problem for a long time. 
He talked to a colleague in the insurance field about his problem. This person was hav-
ing the same problem. Because both entrepreneurs have the same kind of customers 
and a similar relationship with their customers the entrepreneur thought they would 
make a perfect match. The entrepreneur suggested co-operating in the sense of sharing 
an office. After some hesitation the other entrepreneur agreed primarily because he 
needed a financial administrator and because both firms would remain independent. 
The entrepreneur's was not suitable for three persons so the office of his new “part-
ner” was rebuilt and the entrepreneur and his employee also moved in. As they did not 
know whether the co-operation would succeed they introduced a trial period of six 
months. There were a few miscommunications but in general the co-operation was a 
success. Accessibility for the customers improved greatly. After the trial period they 
agreed to keep on co-operating. The entrepreneur is very happy with his decision and 
appreciates the independence of his firm although he thought there might have been a 
further integration of the two offices especially where computerisation in involved. 
A2.14  Start-up of a consultancy agency 
The idea to the start-up a consultancy agency arose in the spring of 2002. The female 
entrepreneur visited her brother after shopping and they had coffee in the garden of   75 
her brother's house and were fantasising about various things. Neither entrepreneur 
was comfortable any longer in the present job. The female entrepreneur worked as an 
accountant and had to work with a new manager with whose appointment she did not 
agree. Her brother was under considerable stress at work and was overworked. He was 
employed by an insurance company and had about 3,000 clients. He had been able to 
offer his clients less and less in the past few years and no longer felt at home in the of-
fice. Because both brother and sister were unsatisfied they both dreamed of having 
their own business and independence many of their relations were entrepreneurs and 
had their own responsibilities. After philosophising for a while their ideas developed 
into a real plan. 
The entrepreneurs talked to an ex-colleague of one of their brothers who also started 
his own agency as an insurance intermediary. After this encouraging meeting they took 
a definite decision. Both of them would resign from their current job and devote all 
their time to starting-up their own agency. They took into account the fact that they 
could take over one of the brother's employer's insurance portfolios and contact all 
their brother's old customers. This all turned out quite differently. Right now they are 
fighting against a competition restraint that has made the start-up difficult and they will 
have to wait for a year before they can approach these customers again. The entrepre-
neurs are satisfied with their independence and do not have any regrets. 
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